Identified as RPE OCR-DA-401-P
NOTE: This is as scanned from a typed document. There are many typos still in this version!

NOTE: This document was obtained from Howard Harding who had gotten it from Walter Krell. Penciled on the cover, Krell had written:
"The enclosed written by Brian O'Neil gives me another laugh. He was one of our great warriors and among the greatest guys I've ever known, but I can't imagine him going over the target all strung out like that. I do remember leading out with a flight of B-26s on that 4th of July, but can't recall the details."

The battle for New Guinea had been in progress for about two months "hen the Fifth Air Force, part of the United States army Air Corps, stepped in __to stem the flow of Japs and to attempt to save Australia from the yellow peril.

In those days, before the Fifth �lr Force had been placed under the command of Lieut. Gen. George C. Kenney and his very able assistant Major Gen. Ennis C. Whitehead, and for a short time to follow this change, preceding any opportunities Gen. Kenney had had to build it up lnto the formidable fighting machine it is today, there were many trying" and �xcltina days.

Thin"s had to be planned and worked out to suit the equipment then in use. We had planned to "ive the Japs as hot a time as we could, with what was on hand, on the anniversary of our our day of freedom.

The Nips had been plastered for twelve hours with a new type bomb and for the next twelve hours �ussle Catalinas were to drop the same type of fireworks. In other words Lae, on the morning" of July 4th, 1942, our own Independence Day, should be nothing but a peaceful shambles of a toun. We had two missions set up, which had been well thou"ht out and planned for some days previous, to give the Japs some real trouble on that day.

In those days we had no pursuit cover on raids, and the element of surprise was a great factor in preservina our men. Capt. Walt Kr�ll, leading the first flight was to come in from the ocean, a half hour before our flight was due to come down th� Markham Uall�y, attackln" th� tar"�t in th� oppos�te d�rection, on the way to the sea. Up until this time Port "Moresby had been raided practically every day by the Nips, so it was our plan to use this type of bomb, believing" lt would demolish their runwa"s, and thus keep the Nips on the "round. The crews had been briefed the ni"ht before the raid, with the understandin" that if the Nips possibly "ot off the around and came over to bomb us, before the contemplated time for the mission, and we were forced to take our planes off the around, as was our policy of protection in those days, we would continue on to the tar"et.

In the early da"s of the war it was our policy to have each crew standin" by their airplanes from dawn to dark. This was necessary, so that if we did have an air raid we could take our ships off the "round and fly out of ran"e of the raiders until the dan"er period had passed.

On this July the Fourth, the weather was as usual hot and mucky; every airplane had some sort of a crew lyin" around on the "round in the shade of the win"s. " few of us were sitting in the intelligence tent with one of the Group Commanders, discussing" the mission to be. It was his theory that we would not only escape having an air raid that day, but that on our mission we would not be attacked by zeros. H� arrived at this conclusion because of the type of bomb that had been dropped. Some of us d�sa"reed with him, knowin" from our own experience the small amount of time it took to repair runways after a raid, so he and I made two small wa"ers on our little dispute.

Just at this time the air raid warning sounded, winning for me the first bet, and givina every indication that zeros would be over our target to "�ve us a warm welcome, and to win for me the bet that I would rather have lost.

The tent was cleared �nstantly, men scatterin" in all directions. The "round crews did a marv�lous Job as usual, rema�n�n" at their work until the last second b�fore takin" cover �n slit trenches, in order that the planes and crews on the field mi"ht be airborne before the enemy struck.

One of them started drivin" me in a Jeep to my crew and plane which was down, on the far side of the runway. on the way I unconsciously Felt for my Holy "edals, which were always carried in the lower pocket of my coveralls. I discovered, much to my dismay, that I had dropped them, so without thinkin" we turned around and went back up the runway to see if they could be found. our planes had already commenced takin" off which prevented us from crossin" the runway at the point where we started. Time was exceedin"ly precious at that instant so I had to abandon m" search. Upon approachin" the ship I saw that the copilot had already started the en"ines; the crew had taken their places. �fter fastenina my parachute and life vest I took the pilot's seat and taxied to the other end of the field for takeoff.

Our ship was third from last in the line of planes to take off, and as we approached the end of the runway the red flaG was raised over the drome indlcatin" that the Nips were overhead. The crews in "he two ships in front of ours shut their enain�s off immediately and cl�mbed out abandon�n" their planes at th� end of th� runway, th� first plane's crew causina the second to follow their example.

We knew this meant two less ships on the raid, and it also forced our ship and the two followin" to swln" wid� over th� grass for a dan"erous takeoff, with a full load. We knew from former experience that we had JUSt as much of a chance of remaininp alive, if we took offj savin" the ships and continuin" on to the tar"et, as to abandon them all in a "roup at one end of the field, and to seek slit trenches or duyouts for our own protection.

When we had cleared the "round and were airhorne, I made a shallow turn to the left and looked over my shoulder, and to my elation discovered that the last two ships had safely followed us off, even thou"h bombs were droppinp directly behind them.

We were maintainin" radio silence, because we knew the Nips were tuned in on our fre"uency, and would be forewarned that we were on our way to bomb them. Because of this, we had a "reat deal of trouble sianalin" to the two ships, as they drew up alon"side to Join formation, of our intention of "oin" on to the tarpet althou"h we only had a flipht of thre�.

As we fl�w up the coast Spt. Moe Givone, the En"ineer"unner, sent up a Holy Medal to me. �lthouah S"t. Lizotte, Turret-ounner, and Sat. Reilly, Radio-"unner, also carried medals, Givone was the only one who had one to spare. This put the whole crew at ease, for if a pilot is worried the whole crew worries, and apparently by my actions before takeoff, I had conv�yed to them the idea that I did not desire to leave the ground without protection of these r�lics.

As we were approaching the pass between the mountains, we noticed that both wing sh�ps were hi"h above us. It was our impress�on, because of the�r action, that they wished to fly at a hi"her altitude over the clouds. "s we had no obJection to this, we chan"ed our air-"as ratlo over For hiah altltud� performance, "ivin" us "r�at�r speed, which was �xactly what we needed at this time to aain their altitude, and to move a sli"ht bit ahead of them. This maneuver was almost our undoin", for it turned out that we w�r� over the tar"et in less than twent" minutes, and much to our chaarin, ahead of our accompan"in" win" men, who we then realized wer� only playin" around in order to relieve nervous tension, and had not been seekin" a hi"her altitude.

On an approach to a tar"et, the tension runs h�ah; it must be somethin" like waitin" in the dark hours of the morning", JUSt before dawn, to start a landino procedurel or Qett�n" readu to make a char"e. �t this time man" thin"s pass throu"h on�'s mind, and th� ima"ination runs uncurbed. "Will I lose my nerve when flak starts breakin" all around us, and swerv� from the bombardiHr's course"" "Will the enem" Fi"hters outnumber U5 oreatly?" "Will "e do a "ood Job of both bombin" and shootin" shootino down fiohters"" This last thou"ht is prevalent.

Lieut. Wayne Hartman, as he entered the bombardier's compartment, observed, "I'm scared stiFf." I said, "Bo", "ou have nothin" on me, so am I." � few minutes after that we s�"hted our taroet and nervousness was For"otten; we had too much to occup" our minds. We were preparin" to make our run. We apain chan"ed to our former a�r-"as ratio For lower altitude and our bomb-ba" doors were opened; the run was started.

At that moment the photographer, S"t. D. C. Mitchel, �n the tail of the ship called on the interphone and wanted to know if this was a new system of bombing; "�re we bombing in trail?" Immediatel" the answer came hack From the copilot, Capt. M�l OfFers, "H�ll no, how Far in the r�ar are our win" men" bout a quarter of a mil�," was the reply.

On both sides of us, takin" it eas" in the haze, were about twent" zeros, waltin" for us to finish our bombin" run, well out oF ran"e of their own ack-ack. Well in front, on the homeward course were three zeros doin" fi"ure ei"hts in the sk". I had never seen this beFore and later I was to make the mistake of swin"in" into them.

The Flak was heavy, intense but lnaccurate, it beina ahead and above us. We were now over the taraet and there was but one thin" for us to lay an accurate strin" oF bombs in the sectors we were desi"nated. We aave the bombardier a two-minute run and as the pictures later showed, it was well worth it - but those two minutes seemed like an eternit". The Flak was now at our level, burstin" Just to the ri"ht. Would Hartman ever "ive the word, "Bombs "wa""

It finall" came and with a si"h oF relief we started evasive action. We still could not clos� our bomb-ba" doors as we were waitin" for the last ship to "ive that si"nal. We waited for th�s s�onal so that the other ships could close Format�on and we would not widen the "ap between us. Finall" the abovementioned si"nal came and we turned on the homeward course w�th still too much distance between our ships for a "ood defensive Formation.

Th� thr�e aforementioned zeros were startin" to close with our ships. The two wina ships were " throttle back instead of "ainino speed for the runnin" fioht that was sure to follow. The natural combat evasion, w�th approachin" enem" a�rcraft from head on, is a dive, but with the formation spread we could not aFFord this, as we would have "ainod too much speed for the two rear shipY to close up the formation. ThereFore, we had to maintain the same altitude, throttled back, with the hopss that the" would close Fast with our ship For selfprotection.

With bullets burstino in the nose of the cockpit, Capt. Offers, the copilot, dove down behind the panel and without thinkina I did the same. We knew the Japs must have thou"ht that the �mericans had discovered some sort of a new automatic pilot, or a radio "uide, so that pilots were no lon"er necessar", as no one could be seen in our cockpit.

The action was fast and furiDus from then on. � bullet ontered tho bombardier's compartment, and �mmediatel" followin", "el Offers raised h�s trouser to show that he was bleedin" from the lep. "s his wound did not look too serious, at the moment, I shouted, "How does he look down below?" The response I received was very discouraging: "Good God, he's bleeding from the neck!" My first thouohts were, "It's throu"h the neck; the man is dead." Thero �" no wa" of describin" the feelin" that comes over uou when "ou think that a crew mem_er has been fatall" wounded. It was a deadenin" and discoura"ino fe�lin", but at that moment I had to dive to keep from a runnina head-on collision with the zeros. "s lt happened it was Fortunate for all, _ecause the two wino ships were now closina-in fast to form our orioinal Formation, and uould have overrun our ship, iF we had not increased our speed at that moment.

The runnin" fi"ht was JUSt beuinnin", for the rest of the zeros were closin"-�n from the ri"ht, from the rear and from below. We had "ained some spe�d w�th the div� and w�re now all mainta�nino approximatel" 25o miles-per-hour. our altitude had chan"ed from 9500 feet to 7soo feet when the report came throu"h from Givone. "I "ust f�n�shed ofF one oF those Jap --------. He came �n from below at 6 o'clock."

Our situation was t"pical of the warfare that was ao�n" on �n that area at that time, three bombers, with no pursu�t protection, a"ainst twentu enem" fi"hters. Some zeros closed from the ri"ht and we banked steepl" in order to reduce their time oF fire, and also to oive each of our turret-uunners an opportunitU to u"e hls ouns. Just then, l�ke music to m" ears, a sudden and continuous rat-a-tat-tat started to belch from our bombard�er's compartment, and a zero which swun" too far in Front of us, went down in flames. We knew that our bombardier, Hartman, was not seriousl" wounded, but was able to oive a" well ag take. This wa" the encouraoement we needed; we knew then we could take them.

The formation was holdina tiUht and we a"ain swun" to the riuht. Lizotte, m" turret-"unner, opened up and we saw another zero burst into flames. Then Reill" reported, "" God, we "ot two."

"fter strai"htenina out we ran past Salamaua and Lieut. �rt Hu"hes, who was fl"in" the left win", pulled up, and flew a hiUh position to protect Capt. "ichaelis' ship, whose "uns had Jammed. Art Hu"hes, one of the best combat men in that area, did a remarkahle Job that da". Throu"h his skillFul pilotin", he yuided his ship, so that it was in a firiny position every time the NipS made an attack on the side of the disabled wino ship. We later lost this wond�rful pilot with whom it was an honor and a privile"e to serv�.

We had a runniny fi"ht from then on for forty minutes, a description oF which is describable onl" b" zeros at one o'clock, zeros at three o'clock, and zeros at six o'clock.

At the end of forty minutes we knew we were comin" out of the danyer zone, as the zeros were breakina off the attack. Capt. Offers called back to the win" ships to Find out �f an" zeros were st�ll trailin3 us. The report came back immed�ately that on the other side oF some cumulus clouds two zeros persisted ln followlno us, and ml"ht sttack. BU this time, two zero5 seemed fa�rl" tame, so we started a climbing turn on our final leg to our base. �s we swun", and they attacked, Lizotte Finished off his third zero For the da"; "itchel, Hartman, and Givone each had one to their credit For that da", "ivin" our plane a total oF six For the da". The final report was twent" zeros attackin", ten zeros shot down. What a day! What a feelin"l

We climbed to 13, ooo feet to clear the Owen Stanley ranye which run" like.a vertebrae down the middle of New Guinea. From here on it was a routine homeward fli"ht. The rema�n�nG zeros had broken off the f�yht and had returned to Lae.

Upon landin" at our home field, we were asked by the "round crews, they not realiz�n" that we had "one on to the tar"et, why we had remained airborne For such a lon" period, as the raid on Port "Moresby had terminated about an hour and a half previousl". Col. Divine, our Group Commander, m�t us with his usual concerned and in"uirin" look. He was one of the f�nest commanders in that area.

When he saw Capt. OfFers wounded lea, and our bombard�er's fac� Filled "ith shattered alass, he uas exce�d�n"lu worried, but was more than to find they were only flesh wounds. Pictures later showed that our fliaht of three ships had put bomb" throuoh the Jap dispersal area and supply dump. He could tell from our sh�p" w�thout ask"n" that we had completed our mission, for there was a hole in one oF the cyl�nders in tho left enoine oF our ship which had apparently lod"ed there on that flrst Frontal attack.

Capt. Krell, who was supposed to hav� "one over the taroet th�rtu minutes ahead oF our Fl�"ht, landed an hour later, only f�ve of his six ships returnln". B�cause of the air raid at Port "oresbu, both his fl�"ht and ours had gotten off almost simultan�ousl", but due to the fact that his Fll"ht had taken a lon"er. route, they arrived over the tar"et thirty to Forty-"ive minutes after we had dropped our "ombs.

We had a rou"h time but, thank God, we were lucky. Capt. Krell's fli"ht had found it more ru"yed, but the Japs had the worst of it all. The dama"e don� by these two fli"hts was more effective than all the bombs dropped duriny the precedin" twentyfour hours. Thls had indeed been the real Fireworks on that Independence Day.

Aft�r the int�lli"�nc� brisfin" I drov� across the runway and there on th� "round, in front of the tent I had left, were my Hol" "edals. I still have theml and also the one "iven to me b" G�vone, tail-"unner, on th� trip up the coast that da".

Two months later this wonderful crew was to be disbanded, so that each m�"ht "o out to teach what he had learned. Capt. Offers, our copilot, who later became a Squadron Commander, and an sxceedin"l" fine one, has passed on.

We had quite a few missions after that one but none with as few planes takln" part, doin" as much dama"e to the enemU.

The Bismarck Sea Uictor", which was probabl" the "reatest victor" at that date", of land-based planes over sea power, "ave us much more satisfaction, and did a "reat deal more damaae", but this was accomplished after Gen. Kenne" had built hi" "ir Force into a maJor-lea"ue team, with pursuit protection, more bombers, and a lot more of the necessary supplies. The earl" da"s were indeed rou"h.

March 2nd and 3rd, 1943.
"Japanese ship" sunk out of a possible 22 - 10 Warships and 12 Cargo Ship or Merchantmen.