MS1741 Stephen E. Ambrose WWII#9A2.doc
Go - home - overview - index - manuscript menu
Donor
Source
PIMA ID
Donor ID
Category
Michael N. Ingrisano, Jr
Michael N. Ingrisano, Jr
NA
CT-MS-1741
CT-G-MS

STEPHEN E. AMBROSE:

WORLD WAR II SINS


STEPHEN E. AMBROSE:

WORLD WAR II SINS



Compiled by

Michael N. Ingrisano, Jr

1839 Rupert Street
McLean, VA 22101-5434
703-356-5538
e-mail <mingnan@juno.com>
and
Veterans and Heirs of Veterans
of
The World War II
Troop Carrier Command

2001
Contributors

Michael N. Ingrisano, Jr., 316th TCG
Nancy H. Ingrisano, 316th TCG
Randy Hils, 440th TCG, son
Robert Murphy, 505 PIR, 82nd AB
John Shirley, 3rd Inf. Div.
Lew Johnston, 314th TCG
Robert Cloer, 315th TCG
Jan Bos, Nijmegen, Holland
Buddies of the Ninth, England
Ray Lowman, 9th AF Association
William Prindible, 316th TCG
Julian Rice, 316th TCG
Robert Callahan, 314th TCG
Salvatore Mandarino, 313th TCG
Donald Orcutt, 440th TCG
Joseph Flynn, 435th TCG
Halmar Moser-Flynn, 435th TCG
Charles H. Young, 439th TCG
Charles D. Young, 439th TCG, son
Rufus Leggett, 36th Inf.
Edward Strobridge
Contents

Preface
1. The Sacramento Bee Story
2. The Washington Post Story
3. The Troop Carrier Aircraft and The Crews That Manned It
4. D-Day, Ambrose’s Book—The Sin
5. D-Day, Ambrose’s Book—Other Sins
6. A Sin of Omission, American Glider Pilots
7. Band of Brothers, Ambrose’s Book—The Sins
8. Sins of Inconsistency,—Band of Brothers versus D-Day
9. Band of Brothers, Continued
10. We Are Not Alone
11. The Mortal Sin
12. The Apologists
13. Forgive For I Have Sinned. I Confess…
14. Go and Sin Some More
Illustrations
The C-47 (line drawing)
C-47 with D-Day markings
C-47 in Formation (line drawing)
C-47 in Mass Formation (line drawing)

STEPHEN E. AMBROSE:—WORLD WAR II SINS

PREFACE:


Stephen Ambrose’s widely acclaimed history of the building of the transcontinental history has drawn criticism for the errors perpetrated by the author. These errors have been publicized recently in two newspapers, one on each coast, The Sacramento Bee, and The Washington Post. For the Bee, Ambrose chose to be mum about his mistakes. For the Post, he chose to say that he would fix the one error in the revision. The presence of questionable history is not unique to Ambrose’s railroad book.
Since 1995, World War II veterans of the Troop Carrier Command have attempted, to no avail, to establish a dialog with Ambrose to correct his errors and present the true story of their mission in his 1995 book, D-Day, June 6, 1944, The Climactic Battle of the World War II.
While conducting that failed effort, the Troop Carrier community also found that Ambrose committed errors in an earlier book (1992), Band of Brothers: E Company, 506th Regiment, 101st Airborne from Normandy to Hitler’s Eagle’s Nest, which also not only misinterpreted the Troop Carrier’s role, but also infringed on the integrity of other Army units.
In reverse order both the recent newspaper stories will be discussed, followed by a discussion of erroneous statements from his WWII books to show that Ambrose has followed the same pattern of popularizing his histories, regardless of what the records show.

1. The Sacramento Bee Story:


On January 1, 2001, Matthew Barrows, staff writer, for The Sacramento Bee, in a page 1 feature entitled, “Rail buffs blow whistle on Ambrose book errors” noted that “Stephen E. Ambrose may be one of the nation’s foremost historians, but local railroad scholars think that his newest book belongs on the fiction side of history.” The reference was to Ambrose’s latest book, “Nothing Like It in the World: The Men Who Built the Transcontinental Railroad, 1863-1869.”
The substance of Barrows’ article is based on a 24-page letter prepared by railroad buffs. In “Sins of Stephen E. Ambrose,” the Committee for the protection of “What is True” in Railroad History, chaired by G.J. “Chris” Graves, Newcastle, California, with contributions from Edson T. Strobridge, San Luis Obispo, California, and Charles N. Sweet, Ogden, Utah, list, in chronological order, some 50 text pages, and six photo captions in which Ambrose erred, misstated the facts or used quotes that cannot be substantiated with facts.
According to Barrows, “After looking over the 24-page critique of his latest book, Ambrose chose not to respond, according to his son.
‘He thought it over and he’s decided to say, ‘No comment,’ said his son, Hugh Ambrose, from their office in Helena, Montana. Stephen Ambrose cites his son as the primary research assistant for the book.”

2. The Washington Post Story

On January 11, 2001, Lloyd Grove, who compiles “The Reliable Source” column for The Washington Post, (Section C, page 3), had an item which read:
“Our Post colleague, Civil War buff, Hank Burchard, is among the alert readers who recently discovered a serious historical error in Stephen Ambrose’s latest blockbuster, ‘Nothing Like It in the World: The Men Who Built the Transcontinental Railroad 1863-1869.’ On page 292, the superstar historian writes that ‘George B. McClellan’s uncoded orders were captured by the Confederates before the battle of Antietam, giving Robert E. Lee a chance to read them.’ It turns out that Ambrose got it exactly backward: It was the Union Army that captured Lee’s orders. A chastened Ambrose told us his foul-up will be fixed for the next edition of the book which has already been through nine printings. ‘I have no idea why I made this mistake,’ I am embarrassed to the tips of my toes.’”
Interestingly, in the January 1 Bee article, Barrows also cites the same error, which was cited by the Railroad buffs on page 15 of their study.


3. THE TROOP CARRIER AIRCRAFT AND THE CREWS THAT MANNED IT

In his book, D-DAY, JUNE 6, 1944, CLIMACTIC BATTLE OF WORLD WAR II, Stephen E. Ambrose wrote so little about the mission of the IX Troop Carrier Command that, in effect, he relegated its performance to an almost non-combat status. As a matter of fact, neither Troop Carrier Command nor any variation of that title appear in the index of the book.
It is for this reason that it is appropriate to provide some background of the activities of this veteran unit to give it, its aircraft, and its personnel their rightful identities. Readers will then have some idea what was happening in this branch of service in the United States Air Force (then the U.S. Army Air Force), and from that understanding be more knowledgeable of the controversy that exists between these WWII veterans and the aforementioned author.
Background:
The first impression of D-Day Normandy is that which is shown on TV and in the movies. One sees a vast armada of ships standing off the coast of France, waiting to disembark thousands of soldiers on the beaches defended by the German Army. Generally, the scene is easily visible because the day had started to lighten when the land forces ‘hit the beaches.’ The next scenes show many of the casualties, the men who did not make it, floating face down on the water; or being treated for wounds suffered during the landings.
What is rare and not commonly cited is that before these forces hit the beaches at dawn of June 6, 821 troop carrier planes [C-47] of the IX Troop Carrier Command, carrying 13,000 paratroopers had taken off from air fields in southern and midland England beginning at about 23:00 hours British time on June 5. They began dropping their paratroopers and equipment shortly after 1:00 hours on June 6. The planes, manned by some 5000 airmen from the 50th, 52nd, and 53rd Troop Carrier Wings, dropped the fully equipped, [and some times overloaded] paratroopers of the 82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions over several drop zones [DZs] in Normandy.
In addition, the troop carrier planes carried and dropped pararacks [four to six per plane] attached to chutes and racked on the forward belly of the aircraft. And, in many cases, artillery pieces and other support materiel were shoved out of an open door by air crew members to the troopers who had just jumped from their planes.
Markings: Often overlooked and rarely understood are the markings on these aircraft. Immediately prior to the June 5 [postponed to the 6th], every Allied aircraft was painted with broad black and white stripes on its wings and rear fuselage. The reason for this precaution was to avoid the tragedy that had taken place in the invasion of Sicily, in Operations Husky 1 and 2, July 9-12, 1943. During these night operations, troop carrier planes were mistaken for enemy planes, and some 23 planes of the 52nd Troop Carrier Wing, some still with paratroopers aboard, were accidentally shot down by American Navy and Army units. Hence all Allied planes, troop carrier, fighters, and bombers, bore black and white “invasion stripes” for the invasion of France and subsequent missions.
Myth Number 1: One myth perpetuated by some writers is that the term “D-Day” was used only for the invasion of France. Actually it is a generic term meaning the first day of an invasion. Hence, in the North African-European theater, the term is applied to the invasions of North Africa, Sicily, Italy, France, Southern France, Holland and Germany. The same is true for the invasions in the Pacific. D-Day Normandy gets the most visibility because it is the most well known.
Myth Number 2: Another myth is to identify the Troop Carrier Command, which flew combat missions, with that of the Air Transport Command which did not fly combat missions. (IX Troop Carrier Command personnel jokingly defined ATC as meaning “allergic to combat.”) Both commands flew the Douglas C-47. The distinction between the two commands was not apparent even to General Eisenhower. On August 10, 1944, the General appeared at reviews to decorate and honor the paratroopers from the airborne regiments. Some members of the Troop Carrier Command, 52nd TC Wing, were present for the review near Greenham Common. To their consternation and disgust, in his talk, Eisenhower addressed them as members of the ATC [Air Transport Command].
The Douglas C-47:
What is there to know about the planes and the crews that manned them? [This discussion includes only aircraft crews and is not intended to slight our courageous comrades, the Glider pilots, who were assigned to every squadron, and flew gliders on most combat missions.]
The C-47 was the workhorse of the IX Troop Carrier Command. Affectionately known as “the goose” or in some quarters, “the gooney bird,” it was modified from a design which was used by airlines of the era for passenger travel. The wartime version, painted olive drab, was 65 feet long and had a wing span of 95 feet.
Field Markings: Each plane had several tail and nose identifiers,—on its tail a serial number, for example, 43-15510, and a radio call letter, “F” for fox or freddie.
On its nose, was a large field number; each squadron within a group was assigned field numbers beginning with 1 to19, 20 to 39, 30 to 59, and 60 to 79. When more numbers were needed, a zero was added to the front, such as, 025. And for the invasion of Europe, each squadron was assigned an additional identifier consisting of a number and a letter, e.g., 4C, W7, 6E, T3. [For the 36th, 37th, 44th and 45th TC Squadrons of the 316th TC Group.]
Tables of Organization: Generally, each of the three troop carrier wings, 50th, 52nd, and 53rd, had four or five groups assigned to it. Each group had a headquarters and four squadrons in its complement. Each squadron had an average of 20 to 25 aircraft.
For a rough estimate, the IX Troop Carrier Command had a total complement of some 25 to 30,000 personnel, of which 4 to 5000 were air crewmen.
Structural Modifications: Totally vulnerable, the C-47 had no protective armor, was not fitted with self-sealing gas tanks, until just before the last airborne mission of the war in Europe.
On the topside and middle of each wings were three tiny light, blue lights, set approximately four feet apart. There were also three on top of the fuselage. All were shielded with slightly raised flat aluminum covers, so that their reflection could only be seen by another aircraft flying on its flank or to the rear.
In addition, the two engines were sheathed with flame dampeners,—cone-shaped perforated steel covers minimizing the exhaust glow from burning engine fuel.
Parapacks: The parapacks mounted on the belly of the aircraft were not covered with armor. A direct hit could be disastrous since the packs were loaded with ammunition, other explosive materials, food and medicine.
Modified Doors: Another modification of the C-47 was the rear door, on the left side of the fuselage, looking forward. It was double ordinary size, split in two. Both doors were opened for the loading of jeeps, aircraft engines, and other large materiel. For a paratrooper drop, the right hand door was removed and the right hand wall was taped to prevent any damage to the jumper or his release line.
The Chalk Number: One other modification was the addition of a “chalk number”—a number inscribed with chalk on the rear of the fuselage before a mission, either in front of the closed door, close to the wing, or behind the open door, closer to the tail. This number was critical for the troopers to be able to identify their assigned aircraft; and it also established for the air crew the plane’s position in the flight formation.
Rigged for Jumpers: On the inside of the aircraft, the nose section was the crew’s working space. Behind the door leading into the body of the cabin were aluminum, and/or plywood bucket seats, lining both walls where troopers sat facing each other. Behind the troopers were windows for viewing the passing world in flight. Running down the center top of the plane was a steel cable where the troopers hooked their static lines prior to jumping. This cable was strong enough so that when a trooper left the plane, his line parachute “rip cord” would play out to clear the trooper from the plane’s body, as his parachute deployed. These lines were then pulled in by the air crew as the plane headed home.
Rigged for Freight or Evacuation Missions: When the aircraft was used for hauling freight, gasoline, and other supplies, the bucket seats were folded up against the plane’s inside wall.
When stretcher wounded were to be evacuated, leather straps were suspended from the roof and secured to the floor. The stretcher handles were then inserted into four loops to secure and hold the weight of the patient. These stretchers could be stacked three high from the floor to the ceiling of the plane on both walls of the plane, thereby allowing the evacuation of some 18 patients. Walking patients used the bucket seats. On these missions, flight nurses and other medical personnel were assigned to attend to the patients.
The Air Crew:
Members: Normally, a C-47 combat crew consisted of four airmen,— two commissioned officers, and two non-commissioned officers. The two commissioned officers were trained pilots. Generally the senior in rank or experience was designated the plane commander or pilot. His assistant was designated the co-pilot.
The two non-commissioned members, both trained in their specialty fields at Air Force Technical Training Commands, were the crew chief [aircraft engineering and mechanics school], and the radio operator [radio operators and mechanics school.]
If the plane was to lead a three-plane formation [or vee], a navigator, a trained commissioned officer, was added to the crew. Rarely was there a second navigator—only if the plane had GEE, which only “one or two” per serial did. Navigators, freshly trained, were prohibited from using Rebecca-Eureka, no GEE, and in clouds.
Both the crew chief and the radio operator were generally assigned to one aircraft. The other personnel changed according to the nature of a mission, and their availability. For combat missions, often the same pilot and co-pilot flew as a team with the crew chief and radio operator.
Cabin Positions: Pilot and Co-Pilot: Obviously, the pilot and co-pilot flew the aircraft from their respective positions. Looking forward of the aircraft into the cockpit, the pilot sat in the left chair, the co-pilot in the right.
Overhead in the cockpit there was an emergency exit. Behind the pilot’s positions, there was a wall, with an access opening between them to allow movement into and out of the cockpit.
Immediately behind the pilot’s position was an open space and an emergency exit door. And behind the co-pilot was an identical space but it was used to store a variety of crew necessities, bedrolls, tool kits, parachutes and more.
Radio Operator: The radio operator’s position was behind the co-pilot and the storage area. He sat in a swivel chair surrounded with transmitters, receivers, power supply and Morse code key.
Navigator: Opposite the radio operator’s position was the navigator’s station. Separated by a wall from the emergency exit door, it contained a table for viewing navigation maps and for doing calculations. Immediately to its left was a small window, perhaps, twelve inches long by 4 inches high, through which navigator could view the terrain, or assist in dead reckoning by identifying ground check points.
Crew Chief: Generally stood in the open space between the pilots, where he could observe the instrument panel to assure that the plane was performing as expected. During a combat drop, the crew chief stood at the back of the plane with the jumpmaster so that he could relay information from the cockpit to the jumpmaster.
When loading the plane with jumpers, the crew chief and radio operator generally assisted the heavily-equipped paratroopers up the three steps into the plane. After the paratroopers left the aircraft, the crew chief and radio operator pushed bundles or other materiel out of the plane, and then pulled the chute lines aboard.
Combat Gear and Arms: For a combat mission, the crews were issued protective flak jackets [or vests] which only covered the upper half of the body; or the lower half if an individual chose to sit on his jacket. Pilots were also issued armored seat pads. In addition, the crew members wore leggings and steel helmets. The pilots and co-pilots wore or had goggles to protect their eyes in the event a shell shattered the wind shield.
The pilots and co-pilots were issued chest parachute packs. They wore the harness, with the chute handy when needed. The navigator, radio operator, and crew chief were issued seat packs which were cumbersome and clumsy to use. Most chose not to wear this chute until it was absolutely necessary. Generally, the C-47 was flown at such low altitudes in combat that it would be virtually impossible to use the chute in extreme emergencies.
The crews also carried escape kits, gas masks, and firearms. The officers wore the standard issue .45 caliber pistol. The enlisted men carried the M-1 carbine. None of these weapons were to be fired from a flying aircraft, but were to used if a crew was forced down in enemy territory. The aircraft had no defensive armament. In their ammunition belts, the crewmen also carried a canteen of drinking water. All personal identities were left at the base.
Miscellaneous Equipment: The Very Pistol: In the crew cabin area, above the emergency door, there was a opening in which a crew member could insert a flare gun or Very Pistol. This gun was used in an emergency, if the aircraft’s ground radio system was destroyed. A red flare would indicate to ground personnel that medical teams were needed to minister to casualties. The piston was also used to fire the “colors of the day,” if challenged, to verify its identity.
Astrodome: In the center ceiling of the forward cabin area was the Astrodome, a small clear, Plexiglas dome through which the navigator could shoot stars for celestial navigation.
Aldis Lamp: During a combat mission, because of radio silence, a crew member standing on a small stool in a lead plane, would flash the Aldis Lamp through the Astrodome. With four minutes before the paradrop, the Lamp, covered with a red filter, would be flashed at formation pilots who in turn alerted the paratroopers to stand and hook up. At the drop moment, the Lamp, now covered with a green filter, was flashed again to inform the pilots [and the paratroopers] that they were over the drop zone.
Dinghy: An inflatable rubber raft, dinghy, in its case, was placed in an out of the way place near the open back door. This raft was to be used in the event that the crew had to abandon ship if it went down in water. All the crews had had or were supposed to have had “dinghy drill” before the Normandy mission.
Lavatory and IFF: Lavatory: Through a small door in the rear of the plane was the lavatory. This convenience was rarely used during a combat mission.
IFF: Or “Identification Friend or Foe” was also located in this area. It was the radio operator’s responsibility to arm the unit on take-off and to disarm it before landing.
Pre-Flight Activities: Each troop carrier combat crew member was assigned specific duties which were performed before the plane left the ground. Crew chiefs virtually lived with their aircraft, assuring that all the elements of their plane were in proper order for combat, emergency, training, or casual operations.
On flight day, the crew chief and radio operator started the preparation by “turning the screws.” That is, hand turning each propeller. After which, occasionally, the crew chief and radio operator would get into the cockpit and electronically start the engines and then taxi the plane out of its revetment closer to the flight line.
When the pilots came out to the plane, their first duty was to walk around the plane for a visual pre-flight check. Once they approved, and entered the cockpit, the crew chief removed the pins [locks] from the front wheels. He would then remove the aileron [wing] locks. The radio operator would remove the tail locks. All were counted and placed in the interior rear of the plane. Either one would draw the three-step ladder into the plane, and close and lock the rear door. [Often, because of training with paratroopers or preparing for a combat drop, the rear door was taken off and part of the walls taped to assure that no trooper’s chute would get hung up or torn when he jumped.]
The pilot would then turn the stick [wheel] again to check that the aileron and tail locks had been removed. Once satisfied that this ground check has been completed, he would engaged the switches to activate each engine.
The plane was then taxied to assume its position on the flight line. Before actual take-off, the pilot, and co-pilot would visually check the instrument panels for any abnormal readings. Just prior to moving into the take-off position, the pilot, holding down the brakes, would run the engines up to maximum speed and check the magnetos. If there were no loss of power, or any negative readings, the plane was then ready for take-off. The crew chief assumed his position behind the pilot, while the radio operator settled into his seat behind the co-pilot and luggage compartment.
While this information may seem elementary to a student of troop carrier history, it is meant as a broad insight into the planes and crews that flew the combat missions for the IX Troop Carrier Command.
It is also hoped that with this background the uninitiated will better understand the differences of what has been written about this veteran command, and about the true story of its role in the Normandy invasion, and other operations.



4. D-Day: Ambrose’s book: The Sins:

Page 198, para. 5: Although there are earlier instances of error, the statements on this page are the most controversial. These will be treated first with other controversial topics to follow.
“The pilots were afraid. For most of the pilots of Troop Carrier Command this was their first combat mission. They had not been trained for night flying, or for flak or bad weather. Their C-47s were designed to carry cargo and passengers. The were neither armed nor armored. Their gas tanks were neither protected nor self-sealing.”
Comments:
There are many negative ideas put forth by Ambrose in this paragraph. Each needs to be analyzed individually.
“The pilots were afraid.” The first reaction by the veterans was anger on several accounts:
1. Ambrose, defying a basic factor of Logic, uses the all-inclusive “The pilots,” or all 1644 pilots who dropped the 82nd and 101st Airborne Division into Normandy on June 6, 1944. The number is based on the author’s own statistic that there were 822 C-47s used for this mission. [page 22, para. 3.] Each plane had two pilots aboard.
2. Following the author’s all inclusive logic, then, 1622 pilots “were afraid.” This would imply that Ambrose interviewed all of these pilots and from their personal recollections heard them testify that in fact they were afraid.
Yet, in a phone call at 6:30 AM, PDT, June 2, 2000, to one of the troop carrier veterans, Lew Johnston, 61st Troop Carrier Squadron [TCS], 314th Troop Carrier Group [TCG], he said: [The following is a transcription.]

“This is Steve Ambrose calling. I’m at [deleted for this document.] In the first place, I want to apologize but I have been incredibly busy the last month and I have been meaning to answer your communications.
I intend no disparagement and I never accused anybody of being cowards, and I did hear from paratroopers that they flew too low and they speeded up too much and that is a generalization.
And I intend to correct any misapprehensions the troop carrier pilots feel that I’ve perpetuated. And I am on my knees. I really am. I try to do my best.
And I did not interview any troop carrier pilots for my book. But I interviewed quite a few of their passengers who weren’t all that happy. But that’s another story.
But I will correct it. I promise. And I am doing the best that I can. It was a big war and there were a lot of people in that war, and mistakes were made. Thank you.”

“I did not interview any troop carrier pilots for my book.” How then could he conclude that the “Pilots were afraid?”
3. Did he ask of his other interviewees who were in the Normandy invasion if they “were afraid?” Then to elevate his logic one step further along this path, if he had interviewed all the men,--Air Air Corps, Army, Navy, American, British, and Canadian, who were in the Normandy invasion, and also asked if they “were afraid.” If he did not, then why did he dishonor, as a class, only the troop carrier pilots whom he admittedly did not interview?
4. Experience might indicate that the statement is virtually true for all combatants. But in using the argumentum ad hominem [loosely translated as “argument against the man,” i.e., character assassination], how does Ambrose justify anointing only the entire class of 1644 troop carrier pilots with the yellow feather.
“For most of the pilots of Troop Carrier Command this was their first combat mission.”
Fact: HUSKY 1: The Invasion of Sicily: “On the night before D-Day the 52d Wing was to dispatch 227 C-47’s to drop American paratroops of the 82d Division in the Gela Area. The Wing was reinforced by the loan of the 64th Troop Carrier Group from the 51st Wing and the 316th Troop Carrier Group from the Ninth Air Force, giving it a total of 250 aircraft for the invasion.” [Dr. John C. Warren, Airborne Missions In The Mediterranean 1952-1945. USAF Historical Studies: No, 74. USAF Historical Division, Research Studies Institute, Air University, USAF. 1955, p. 24. Hereafter: Warren, Airborne- Mediterranean.]
“…Sixteen squadrons of the 52d Wing [61st, 314th, and 64th TC Groups. The 315th was brought down from England to take over the Wing’s supply and evacuations duties.] were based on the plains around Kairouan. The other three, belonging to the 316th Group, were 30 miles north of Enfidaville. On 9 July [1943] final briefing was completed; the planes were loaded and checked; and the wing stood ready for HUSKY.
In its final form, HUSKY 1 was designed to drop the 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment, reinforced by the 3d battalion of the 504th, two batteries of 75mm. Pack howitzers, a company of engineers and sundry small detachments, a total of 3,405 men, on the high ground about five miles northeast of the Port of Gela between 2340 on 9 July and 0300 on D-Day 10 July. Their commander was Col. James M. Gavin.” [Warren, Airborne-Mediterranean, p.29.]
FACT: HUSKY 2, code name: MACKALL WHITE: “The objective of MACKALL WHITE was to drop the 504th PIR (less its 3d Battalion), the 376th Parachute Field Artillery Battalion, and a company of Engineers at Farello, an abandoned airfield three miles east of Gela. They were to be flown to their destination by 144 planes, almost equally from the 61st, 313th, 314th and 316th Troop Carrier groups of the 52d Troop Carrier Wing.” [Warren, Airborne-Mediterranean, p.39.]
FACT: OPERATIONS IN ITALY: GIANT I, and III: “Late in the afternoon of the 13th [September 1943], the [52nd] Wing was advised that reinforcements were needed immediately in the Gulf of Salerno area to assist the 5th Army in maintaining its recently procured beachheads and to counteract the increasing pressure of the German Troops. Within a short space of three hours, Wing airplanes were in the air and over the designated dropping zone. The paratroopers, members of the 504th Parachute Infantry, were jumped and all planes returned safely. Three Groups with a total of 91 aircraft flew on this mission: [GIANT 1], the 61st, 313th and 314th. Three planes from headquarters flew as pathfinders reaching the DZ [drop zone] 15 minutes before the airplanes from the Groups arrived. These three planes, for the first time in Troop Carrier combat history, carried three complete crews of parachutists thoroughly trained and experienced in the use of pathfinder apparatus…
“The following night, 14 September, the mission [GIANT III] was repeated with similar success. All four groups of the wing [61st, 313th, 314th, and 316th] with a total of 85 aircraft assisted in carrying the 505th Parachute Infantry to the DZ of the night before.” [“AT HOME AND ABROAD (MOSTLY ABROAD) with the 52nd TROOP CARRIER WING May 1943-May 1945.” Microfilm 0984, USAFHSO Library, Bolling AFB, Washington, DC, pp. 11-12. Also note: Both the 504 and the 505 PIR were from the 82nd Airborne Division.]
Comment: In this sentence, by using the qualifying word, “most,’ Ambrose again stigmatized troop carrier pilots, without mentioning the previous combat experience of some of the Troop Carrier pilots, and of some of the paratroopers of the 82nd Airborne in the Sicily and Italy missions.
“They had not been trained for night flying, or flak, or bad weather.” Ambrose continues the pattern set in the first sentence by using the all inclusive “they” or, as has been noted, all 1642 pilots.
FACT: CHAPTER 7, “TRAINING”: Ambrose devotes this entire chapter to training. On page 131, para. 1: “For some divisions the assault training had begun in the States. The airborne divisions had been formed in 1941-42 for the purpose of landing behind the Atlantic Wall, and their training reflected that goal. After jump school the airborne had carried out jump, assembly and attack maneuvers throughout the South.”
On page 140, para. 1: “Operation Tiger was not the only training maneuver to produce casualties. The use of live ammunition led to many wounds and some deaths, as did the night jumps for the paratroopers. Maj. David Thomas was regimental surgeon of the 508 Parachute Infantry. On one training jump, a trooper’s chute failed to open. ‘It took us three days to find him.’”
On page 141, para. 1: “Still, it was true that the airborne troops underwent even tougher training than the infantry. Back in Georgia in late 1942, for example, the 506th had made a three-day forced march carrying full equipment, of 136 miles. When the regiment got to England in September 1943, training intensified. There were numerous three-day field exercises, beginning with a jump.”
Continuing on page 141, para. 3: “But of course,” Sgt. D. Zane Schlemmer of the 598th Parachute Infantry commented, “you never get enough training, I’ve found. Once you get into combat, you’ve never had enough training for combat. It is a total impossibility.”
On pages 141-142: Ambrose provides a rather detailed description of the “highly specialized training” of British glider pilots.
Comments:
1. In this 20-page chapter, there is no mention of the training of troop carrier pilots, or even if “they” may have participated in the Georgia maneuvers, the “night jumps” and the “numerous three-day field exercises, beginning with a jump.” Like some of the airborne, Ambrose does not seem to understand how paratroopers got into the air!
2. Ambrose completely ignores “Operation Eagle,” a night jump in May 1944. It was the dress rehearsal for the Normandy drop. He does address this event in his earlier book, Band of Brothers. Therefore any comments on “Eagle” will be reserved for that discussion.
FACTS: Dr. John C. Warren in Airborne Operations in World War II, European Theater. [Hereafter Warren-European.] USAF Historical Studies: No. 97, USAF Historical Division, Research Studies Institute, Air University, September 1956, covers “Deployment and Training,” [Chapter I: The Airborne Invasion of Normandy—Plans and Preparations], pp.20-26. Only selected excerpt will be cited.
Page 20: “On February 6 SHAEF had directed IX Troop Carrier Command to prepare in conjunction with airborne commanders an intensive training program to culminate in May in exercises with an airborne division. The goal of the training was to enable the troop carriers to fly night paratroop missions to within a mile of an objective and to fly glider missions by twilight or moonlight to a given landing zone in formation and within a minute of schedule…By 26 February such a program had been worked out. It called for intensive joint training with airborne troops to begin on 15 March.” [emphasis added by this compiler.]
Page 21: Later the plan was revised to meet General Williams’ [Commanding IX TCC] feeling that training should be made more realistic and that a larger proportion of the program should be devoted to exercise with American airborne units, since all scheduled missions were to be with them.”
Page 23: Addressing the training of the 52nd Wing: “During the training phase…the notoriously bad spring weather of northern England often interfered with flying. However, enough time had been provided so that the training of all but the 315th and 442d Groups were completed with time to spare.
The quality of the 315th and 442d was different from the other four. [61st, 313th 314th, 316th.] The others had flown so much that there was a danger they would go stale. Their pilots had an average flying time of well over 1,500 hours when training began. Most of them had been overseas for more than ten months and had flown paratroop missions. [emphasis added].
Page 23: “EAGLE, the command rehearsal on 11-12 May, had been intended as the final exercise of the training period, but IX Troop Carrier Command recognized that the 315th and 442d Groups needed more work and felt that the 314th had not yet proved itself in night operations. The performance of the three groups in EAGLE bore out this opinion. Accordingly, the 314th was given another night paratroop exercise on 14/15 May, and the training periods for the 315th and 442d were extended to 26 May at which date they, too, made night paratroop drops on a token basis. The three exercises were so completely successful to indicate even the least experienced [emphasis added] groups would be ready for NEPTUNE.” [code name for the Normandy mission.]
Page 24: “During early May the 50th Wing carried on intensive training, including two simulated wing paratroop drops at night. [emphasis added.] No troops were actually dropped, because the 101st Division had finished its jump training except for EAGLE and was adverse to doing more. Although the Wing did well in EAGLE, it considered to be in need of further practice. Since there were no paratroops to drop, it flew four more night drops [added] with simulated drops between 18 and 29 May.”
Page 26: “Time and time again in big and little exercises during the past two months, and in several previous missions, wind and low visibility, particularly at night, [added] had scattered troop carrier formations, twisted them off course or spoiled their drops. Yet the halcyon weather of EAGLE seems to have pushed all this into the background. The field orders for EAGLE had contained full and specific precautions against bad weather. Those [orders] for NEPTUNE were to be notably lacking in such precautions.. Even the requirements for security and the need to send in the NEPTUNE missions under almost any conditions cannot fully explain this neglect.”
Comments: Flak:
1. How would pilots/aircrews train for flak? Should the three Troop Carrier Wings in England, as part of their training prior to D-Day, have flown over France or other hostile territory?
2. Ambrose also does not specify at what point in a flight it is permissible or not permissible to avoid flak. D-Day briefings for troop carrier crews included a warning that absolutely no evasion of flak was to be taken on the run into the drop zones. [Letter, Donald M. Orcutt, 440th TCG, to Ambrose, February 16, 1995.]
“Pilots react to it when they see it. They do whatever seems appropriate at the time to avoid it…When entering the IP [Initial Point] and awaiting the signal for paratroopers to jump, pilots were trained to hold their positions regardless of antiaircraft fire, just as bomber pilots were trained when they were on their bombing runs.” [Letter, Robert E. Callahan, 314th TCG, to Ambrose, May 1, 2000.]
“Their C-47s were designed to carry cargo and passengers.”
Comment: While the statement is essentially true, it is not complete. The primary purpose of a Troop Carrier unit was “to conduct airborne operations.” [See the discussion above about the C-47 and its multiple uses.] In this context, is Ambrose inferring that the C-47 was not equipped to drop paratroopers, and to tow gliders?
“Their C-47s were neither armed or armored. Their gas tanks were neither protected nor self-sealing.”
Comment: Again this statement is essentially true. But in the context of this paragraph, it is possible to suggest that the crews were responsible for this oversight.
FACT: Warren, Airborne-Europe, page. 19:
“During the winter [1943], supply shortages had been frequent, but by late May, time, effort, and high priority had been given the troop carriers all the items they needed for their planes with one exception, self-sealing gas tanks.
The command had asked in February for personal armor and self-sealing gas tanks. Thanks in part to lease-lend assistance from the British they got armored seat pads for the pilots and co-pilots, and flak helmets, armored vests and aprons for all the crew members…The request for self-sealing tanks was turned down; General [“Hap”] Arnold, himself, ruled in February that they could not be spared for troop carrier use. Information in April that 75 such tanks might be available roused IX Troop Carrier Command to new efforts to get at least enough to equip its pathfinders, but these attempts, too, were in vain.”
Summary: Distinguished Unit Citations:
Headquarters Ninth Air Force, General Orders 212, “Battle Honors,” dated 23 August 1944. 1. Under the provisions of Section IV, Circular No. 333, the following units of the IX Troop Carrier Command are cited for outstanding performance of duty in action against the enemy. The citation reads as follows [edited]:
“The 316th Troop Carrier Group…effected 118 sorties…Flying in unarmed and unarmored Troop Carrier aircraft, at minimum altitudes and airspeeds, in unfavorable weather conditions, over water and into the face of strong enemy defenses, without possibility of employing evasive action [added], the planes of this group unloaded their paratroops with extreme precision over vital zones as part of the Troop Carrier spearhead of the Allied Invasion of the European Continent.”
[Note: Every troop carrier group of the 50th, 52nd, and 53rd troop carrier wings was awarded a Distinguished Unit Citation (also know as Presidential Unit Citation) for its performance for the invasion of France, 5, 6 and 7 June 1944. Air Force Combat Units of World War II, edited by Maurer Maurer. (New Jersey: Chartwell Books, 1994. Originally published: Washington, D. C. : U. S. Government Printing Office, 1961.)]


5. D-Day: Ambrose’s Book: Other Sins:

Having treated the most grievous of Ambrose’s sins in the one paragraph on page 198, it is now time to turn to other problems, mainly with his use of language and his almost total ignorance about the C-47, its crewmen, and their role on this “climactic day.”
Page 22, para. 3: “Unseen, but not unheard—the bullets rattled against the wings of the C-47s sounding like rocks being shaken in a tin can. Flying less than 1,000 feet and slower than 120 miles per hour, the planes make easy targets.”
Comments:
1. “Unseen but not unheard…” “Unseen?” Yet, just above that line, the author tells us that the sky was filled “with explosives; machine-gun tracers—green, yellow, red, blue, white…The sight was at once awesome (nearly every paratrooper thought this was the grandest Fourth of July fireworks display he had ever seen.) and terrifying. For every visible tracer, there were five unseen bullets.”
2. “—the bullets rattled against the wings of the C-47s sounding like rocks shaken in a tin can.” Would this observation indicate that these bullets ricocheted off the wings [and fuselages] without penetrating the skin or the internal surfaces of a C-47 which were fabric?
3. “Flying less than a 1,000 feet and slower than 120 miles per hour, the planes make easy targets.” This statement does not provide any real specifics so that a troop carrier crewman can recognize the situation,—the attitude of the aircraft, and the completion of their objectives in the drop.
Page 22, para.4: “As the C-47 lurched this way and that, a consequence of the pilot’s futile effort to escape the flak.” The image here is of a jerky left-right-right-left pilot’s maneuver. Did the author consider the possibility that the aircraft itself was being buffeted by incoming flak, and winds from a storm that was brewing?
Page 159, para. 4: “Pilots will release when the C-47 leading the formation starts a gradual turn to the left to return to the coast.. If a C-47 pilot cuts his glider off too soon…” Does this imply that as soon as the lead pilot dropped his glider, and started to make his turn that all the following pilots were to release at the same time?
Page 159, para. 6: …the glider pilot sitting next to Sgt. Charles Skidmore gave his own answer…” On page 220, para. 4, Skidmore is listed as Lt. Charles Skidmore.
Page 198, para. 6: “The possibility of a midair collision was on every pilot’s mind.” “…every pilot’s mind.”[emphasis added]. As shown earlier in this document, the author admitted that he had not interviewed any troop carrier pilot. How then could he have known what was on the minds of the every pilot?
Page 198, para. 6: “The pilots were part of a gigantic armada: it took 432 C-47s, to carry the 101st Airborne to Normandy, about the same number for the 82nd.” If one adds 432 and 432, he gets a total of 864 planes. The author has already stated that the entire armada totaled 821 planes.
Page 199, top: “…with no lights except little blue dots on the tail of the plane ahead.” There were no “little blue dots…” on the tail of any troop carrier plane.
Page 199, para.3: “Simultaneously, to use the words of many of the pilots, ‘all hell broke loose.’” Here again is another use of the an indeterminate number,-“many” when, by his own admission, no pilots were interviewed.
This litany continues and it serves no purpose to keep repeating the same exaggeration, for in the next paragraph, Ambrose repeats this sin: “They could speed up, which most of them did.” “They were supposed to throttle back to ninety miles per hour or less…”
Page 199, para. 4: “…to ninety miles per hour or less…but ninety miles per hour made them an easy target for the Germans on the ground, so they pushed the throttle forward and sped up to 150 miles per hour, meanwhile either descending to 300 feet or climbing to 2,000 feet or more.”
[Orcutt’s letter. See above.] “On a paradrop mission, drop speed was 110 mph Indicated Airspeed (IAS). At 90 mph IAS…a fully loaded C-47 was uncomfortably close to stall speed. In addition, a high angle-of-attack and near-maximum power output would have been required to maintain that speed at the gross weight of the moment. Routinely, Troop Carrier flew the C-47s at a gross weight of 30,000 pounds or more. In airline use DC-3s [C-47s] were limited to 26, 900 lbs. for takeoff.
Drop altitude was 400 ft. above ground level/day and 700 ft. night.”
In the same paragraph, more of the litany follows. “They twisted and turned, spilling their passengers and cargo. They got hit by machine-gun fire, 20mm shells, and the heavier 88mm shells. They saw planes going down to their right and left, above and below them. They saw planes explode. They had no idea where they were, except that they were over the Cotentin.”
“They twisted”—“They got hit”—“They saw planes”—“They saw planes explode”—“They had no idea…” These descriptions would lead one to believe that troop carrier was taking quite a beating. “They” hurt but “they” flew again.
FACTS: [Warren, Airborne-Europe, Appendix I, “Statistical Tables—Operation NEPTUNE, 5-13 June 1944, p. 224.]
Aircraft:
dispatched: 821
effective 813
abortive 3
destroyed or missing 21
damaged 196
[Ambrose]: Page 200, para. 1: “Virtually every [added] plane got hit by something. One pilot broke radio silence to call out in desperation, ‘I’ve got a paratrooper hung up on my wing.’ Another pilot came on the air with advice: ‘Slow down and he’ll slide off.’”
Footnote 11 credits one Earl W. Peters for the quotations. He is listed in “Appendix A as having contributed his “oral history” or written memoirs to the Eisenhower Center, but there is no indication of whether he served with troop carrier or the paratroops. [Note: “Earl Peters was one of my instructors at 1st Troop Carrier Command’s Flight School, Del Valle, TX in the Spring of 1943. While overseas in 1944, I heard that he had joined one of the TC groups in Europe. Not sure which one.” E-mail from Don Orcutt, March 2001. Subsequently, Orcutt added that Peters joined the 436th Troop Carrier Group, March 2001.]
Page 203, para. 3: “Most of the sticks jumped too low from planes going much too fast. The opening shock was intense. In hundreds if not thousands of cases troopers swung once, then hit the ground. Others jumped from too high up; for them it seemed an eternity before they hit the ground.”
FACT: [Ambrose, D-Day…p. 8] “This book is based overwhelming on oral and written histories collected from the men of D-Day by the Eisenhower Center at the University of New Orleans over the past eleven years. [since 1984?] The Center now has [1995] more than 1,380 accounts of personal experiences…Although space limitations made it impossible for me to quote directly from each oral history or written memoir, all the accounts contributed to my understanding of what happened.”
Comment: “In hundreds if not thousands of cases the troopers swung once, then hit the ground. Others jumped from too high up…” The author provides no statistical evidence for either statement. He also does not specify how many of the 1,380 accounts were from paratroopers to prove that his statements are based on some statistical sampling. [Note: “I’ve had several troopers, one in particular, Dan Furlong of the 508th PIR, tell me that they wanted to swing just once before landing. Dan jumped from a 95th Sqdn plane on 17 September in Holland. He told me that that jump was the best he ever experienced in combat or training.” E-mail from Don Orcutt, March 2001.]
Page 204: para.4: “…had been flying in the lead plane in stick 66 [chalk number 66]…Pilot Frank DeFlita [sic: DeFellita], just behind, remembered that ‘the plane’s lights came on, and it appeared they were going to make it, when the plane hit a hedgerow and exploded.’ There were no survivors.” [note 26.]
FACT: [Missing Air Crew Report (MACR) # 8408] The five man crew of aircraft serial number 42-93095 [91st TCS, 439th TCG] were: 1st Lt. Harold A. Capelluto, pilot; 2nd Lt. John J. Fanelli, co-pilot; 2nd Lt. Bernard Friedman, navigator; Sgt. Albert R. Tillotson, Jr, engineer; and Sgt. Norman E. Thompson.
The aircraft was last seen [Item 4] on 6 June 1944 at 01:12 B [British], 1_ mi. SE of Barneville, on Cherbourg Peninsula.
Item 11: “IDENTIFY BELOW THOSE PERSONS WHO ARE BELIEVED TO HAVE LAST KNOWLEDGE OF AIRPLANE, AND CHECK APPROPRIATE COLUMN TO INDICATE BASIS FOR SAME. Answer: Savercool, Clifford L., 2nd Lt. [checked with an “X”] “Last Sighted.”
Item 12: IF PERSONNEL ARE BELIEVED TO HAVE SURVIVED, ANSWER YES TO ONE OF THE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS: (a) PARACHUTES WERE USED yes : (b) PERSONS WERE SEEN WALKING AWAY FOM SCENE OF CRASH: ------- [no answer].
The MACR also lists the names of the 18 paratroopers who were aboard this aircraft. [This list, showing the next of kin, is not legible. But another list in the packet is legible and only shows the rank and name of the casualties, with a handwritten KIA notation beside each troopers name.]
This initial report was filed on 8 June 1944.
In a 22 September report from Headquarters European Theater of Operations, US Army, item 2, indicates that its records show that with the exception of Lt. Capelluto who is carried as “killed in action,” the other crew members are shown “to be missing in action.”
Item 3. The records also indicate “the present status of the passengers aboard subject aircraft to be missing in action.”
A 14 November 1944 memo from Headquarters, IX Troop Carrier Command still indicates that with the exception of Lt. Capellutto, all the others were still be carried as Missing in Action. It also states that: c. “Last sighted at 01:12 hours, 6 June 1944, just before entering overcast about one and one-half miles from Barneville, France, and about six minutes from destination. Subject aircraft veered to the left and dropped out of sight in the overcast.”
The MACR does not show the final resolution but subsequent indications are that all five crewmen, as well as the 17 passengers were killed in action.
For the aircrew, see Col. Charles H. Young, Into the Valley: The Untold Story of USAAF Troop Carrier in World War II From North Africa through Europe. (Printcomm, Inc. 1995) “In Memoriam: 439th Troop Carrier Group Roll of Honor, 91st Squadron,” pp. 584-585.
FACT: Chapter 11, page 596, note 26 shows that the source, for the information and assumedly the quotation alleged to have been made by Lt. DeFellita, was “Richard Winters oral history, EC.”
Comment: An e-mail on 29 April 2000 from Colonel Young’s son, Charles D., t provides the flight formation with the proviso that “some of the positions could have been adjusted just before the mission.”
Col. Young recalled that Chalk Number 64, Maj. Howard Morton was the flight leader for Flight Three of the 2nd Serial. [Col. Young led the 1st Serial] On Morton’s right wing was Chalk # 65, and on his left wing, Chalk # 66, Lt. Capelluto’s aircraft. Since, however, Chalk # 66 was manned with a navigator, it is possible that Capelluto took the lead. Hence “some of the positions could be adjusted just before the mission.”
[Note: “Major Howard Morton was brother to Captain David Morton, 95th Sqdn., 440th TCG. Dave was shot down and killed leading a 4-ship echelon of towed gliders into Bastogne, 27th December 1944.” E-mail Don Orcutt, March 2001.]
No. 2 element (chalk nos. 67, 68, 69) were to the right of the lead element. Lt. Savercool, who is cited as the last to have seen Capelluto’s plane, was in Chalk No. 69, or on the left wing of the leader.
However, DeFellita was flying as co-pilot in Chalk No. 76, in the number two element of the Fourth Flight. If these positions had been changed, there is no way of knowing if DeFelitta, was, in fact, “just behind” Chalk No. 66.
Too, the MACR reported that “subject aircraft veered to the left and dropped out of sight in the overcast.” Ambrose claims that the plane “maintained course and speed for a moment or two, then did a slow wing over to the right.”
From the evidence presented, there is no way to verify or dispute that the “landing lights came on and it appeared they were going to make it, when the plane hit a hedgerow and exploded.”
There is another shred of evidence which might throw some light or more confusion on this mystery. The Association Forced Landing, French Office, Jean Pierre, 2 Hameau du Nivernais, 28110 LUCE, France, offered this version:

“…Lt. Harold Capelluto was flying the aircraft [#66] and leading the formation, followed by Lt. Frank Deflita’s plane. Deflita remembers, ‘As we flew over Normandy, DCA’s started shooting at us and Harold’s plane got it several times. I could see Flak shrapnels going straight through his plane. After maintaining its course and speed for a while, the plane left the formation and slowly initiated a right turn. I followed it with my eyes and noticed landing lights coming on. I thought it was going to be all right. Then, suddenly, it came crashing down a hedgerow and instantly exploded.’

Henry [not legible], Mayor of Beuzeville au Plain witnessed the accident. He also remembers: “As we awakened to flak shooting and planes flying over the area, I saw a plane close to the village which seemed to be in trouble and attempted to land. I lost sight of it for a brief moment and then heard a loud explosion. The plane had crashed on a hedgerow bordering a field near the village. It burnt for three days and the heat created by the fire made it impossible for us to approach.

47 years later, my friend JEAN PIERRE from the Forced landing Association and I met with Mr. Marjorie…[He] gave us an account of the June 6 forced landing and showed us precisely where it took place. After consulting the American archive “Missing Air Crew Report”, we figured that these would be the remains of plane 66 which transported the “E” Company Commander and staff. While searching the site, we came to the conclusion we dreaded. As we dug the parachute hooks out of the ashes, we noticed they were still locked. None of the occupants had managed to escape the crash and jump. From the ashes that were piled on the hedge up to 80 cm, we pulled out dog tags, crickets, rings, and a watch. The hands of the watch has stopped at 01:12, this only reinforced what we knew about the force of the impact. Among the debris, we also found a helmet which had been completely flattened…”

The document, no date, also has a picture of several paratroopers, Lt. Thomas Meehan, 1st Sgt. William S. Evans, S/Sgt. Murray B. Roberts, and Sgt. Elmer L. Murray, Jr., who were on the Capelluto plane, plus an image of a proposed memorial marker, listing the names of the crew and the seventeen paratroopers,--information obviously found in the MACR.
The misspelling of DeFellita’s name and wording may lead one to believe that the account may have been modified from that which appears in Ambrose’s book.
[Note: The above article was supplied by Richard D. Winters in a letter to Randolph J. Hils, April 12, 2000 Re: “Your research on the accuracy of Dr. Stephen Ambrose’s reporting on the men of Company E. 506th, 101st Airborne on the jump into Normandy on D-Day 1944.”]
In his letter, Winters advised Hils to read the article. He then offers some other thoughts:
“Second: Stop for a moment and just try to imagine the knee-jerk reaction on the part of the pilots of the planes following plane #66, pilot who saw the plane crash and explode. Their natural reaction would be one of personal survival and to take immediate evasive action—and they did just that!”
There is little reason to comment on Winters’ thoughts here, except to note, that they are undocumented, and voice the same all-inclusive condemnation of the pilots’ actions as is evident in Ambrose’s material.
“Third: I was in plane #67, Harry Welsh, plane #68, on down the line to Carwood Lipton in plane #73. We all gave our first-person memories to Steve Ambrose of what happened in our planes those moments before we got the green light and jumped.”
Further Comment: Page 204, para. 4: The lead sentence of this paragraph reads: “Winters did not know it, but his CO was dead.” The note for the entire paragraph, including DeFlita’s [sic] description of the fatal crash, credits Winters as the source. Should the end note number for Winter’s personal memory been placed where it belonged and the DeFellita description given another number, noting the source for his comments ?
Page 206, paras. 2 and 3: These paragraphs describe the experiences of Lt. Col. Benjamin Vandervoort, commanding the 2nd Battalion, 505th PIR, 82nd Airborne.
Ambrose: “Vandervoort broke his ankle when he landed; he laced his boot tighter, using his rifle as a crutch, verified his location and began sending up green flares as a signal for his battalion to assemble on him…” [para. 2.]
“It was a long hike; Vandervoort was much too big a man to be carried; he spotted two sergeants pulling a collapsible ammunition cart. Vandervoort asked them if they would give him a lift. One of the sergeants replied that ‘they hadn’t come all the way to Normandy to pull a damn colonel around.’ Vandervoort noted later, ‘I persuaded them otherwise.’” [Note 32: “Debriefing Conference,” 82nd Airborne, held on August 13, 1944 in Leicester, England. Copy in EC.]
Facts: Lt. Col. Vandervoort’s testimony is the first in the debriefing document. In part, his statement noted: “We dropped pretty well on our DZ. I, myself, was a quarter of a mile from the DZ, and I had a little bit of hard luck on the landing and banged up my foot. I watched the battalion come in and they were well spread out, the ships being too high and too fast. Within fifteen minutes after I got on the ground, I started putting out green flares that worked out well.”
Comments:
1. “broke his ankle when he landed; he laced his boot tighter, using his rifle as a crutch…The debriefing document does not include any of these details.
2. The incident of the sergeant and “Vandervoort noted later, ‘I persuaded them otherwise.’” This too does not appear in the debriefing document. Vandervoort’s name does not appear in the Appendix among those who provided oral histories or written memoirs.
3. Some of the details of the scene described by Ambrose bear some similarity to those found in Cornelius Ryan’s book, The Longest Day.” [page 143].
Ryan: “[Vandercoort]…had broken his ankle on the jump…Captain Putnam, Vandervoort’s battalion surgeon…still vividly remembers his first sight of Vandervoort: ‘His ankle was obviously broken. He insisted on replacing his jump boot, and we laced it tightly.’ Then, as Putnam watched, Vandervoort picked up his rifle and using it as a crutch, took a step forward. He looked at the men around him. ‘Well,’ he said, ‘let’s go.’ He moved out across the field.’”
4. The scene also reminds one of John Wayne in the film of the same name!
Pages 222-223: “Ten weeks later, when the airborne troops were back in England, preparing for another jump, possibly at night, the regimental and battalion commanders of the 82nd gathered at Glebe Mount House, Leicester, for a debriefing conference. They did an analysis of what went wrong, what went right.
They started with the pilots. In the future the paratoop commanders wanted the pilots trained for combat and bad-weather missions. They wanted them forced to slow down—one suggestion was that every pilot of the Troop Carrier Command be made to jump from a plane going 150 miles per hour. They wanted the pilots told that evasive action in a sky full of tracers did no good and caused much harm.” [Note 61, 82nd Airborne Debriefing Conference, August 13, 1944.]
[Note: “‘Operation Neptune’” Debriefing Conference, August 13, 1944.” The copy used for this discussion was from “The Roy E. Lindquist Papers” Archives, U.S. Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, PA. 17013-5008.]
FACT:
DEBRIEFING CONFERENCE-OPERATION NEPTUNE
On the evening of Thursday, 13 August 1944, a debriefing conference was held at the Glebe Mount House, LEICESTER. During the course of the conference each commander present who had commanded a unit the size of a battalion or larger of the 82d Airborne Division in Operation Neptune, was permitted to talk for not to exceed ten minutes. Instructions were that each officer was to speak freely, without restraint, regarding any aspect of the operation during its airborne phase and to offer any criticism he saw fit in the interests of improving our operational technique in future combat. Commanders spoke in the order in which they planned that they would land. Their statements were taken down verbatim as far as possible. At the conclusion of the conference, considerable free-for-all discussion took place of which no records were kept. However, it did have a bearing on the conclusions attached to this report.

The following are selected excerpts from some of the attendees.
Lt. Col. Vandervoort: “I would like to impress upon the Air Corps the necessity for coming down to the proper altitude, and flying at the proper speed. We have stories at the battalion [3rd] from men who spoke to pilots later on, quoting pilots as follows: ‘…and the last time I looked at the air speed indicator we were going at 190 miles per hour.’ It was the hardest opening I ever had. I have jumped at 130 and 140 miles per hour, but this was the roughest I ever had…It tore off some of my equipment.
I believe that the greatest single contribution to the assembly of the 505 was the superior job done by our pathfinder teams, Air Corps and parachute.” [p.2.]
Lt. Col. Krause: (3rd Bn. 505th Inf.): “I would say that in the next three minutes I came as close to being crashed in the air as I ever hope to be. The pilot called for evasive action and we split up. Some went high, some went lower, other right and left. This split our formation and we were well spread. Just about two or three minutes before the drop time, we saw the green T, it was a Godsend and I felt that I had found the Holy Grail. I would say that I dropped from over 2000 feet. It was the longest ride I have ever had in over fifty jumps, and while descending, four ships passed under me and I really sweated that out.”
Colonel Ekman, Commanding Officer, 505th Parachute Infantry: “I had a very hard opening, because we were going at least 150 miles per hour. I do not remember the landing because I was pretty dazed. I was in the midst of a field of cattle when I landed. No other personnel around me. It took me about ten minutes to get out of my chute.”
“…I also came in from a higher altitude and a greater speed that I should have, and believe that the Air Corps should receive more training in dropping our units.”[pp.3-4.]
Lt. Col. Mendz [Mendez], 3rd Bn., 508th Prcht. Inf.: “We jumped from about 2100 feet, the entire serial, and were going rather fast. 2100 feet is too much of a ride…We never saw the T, we jumped on the green light. The pilot did not see the T light either. It would be helpful to have earphones from the jump master to the crew chief and pilot.”
Colonel Lindquist: 508th Parachute Infantry: “I went out about 1200 feet near Amfreville, it was a good opening and a soft landing in about 2_ feet of water.” [p.6]
Lt. Col. Ostberg, 1st Bn, 507th Prcht Inf.: “Phone communication should be in the plane. Second hand information is no good, but you can’t tell the pilot what his job is. We dropped from a low altitude. I landed in a very flat field, but it was inundated.” [p.6.]
Lt. Col. Kuhn, 3Bn., 507th Prcht Inf.: “The Air Corps sold us a snow job for they changed the SOP. I was in the lead ship of my Bn. Telephonic communication should be established between the crew chief and jumpmaster…There was no communication with the pilot whatsoever. I never had such a hard opening in my life.” [pp.6-7.]
Lt. Col. Timmes, 2d Bn., 508th Prcht Inf: “We got below a lot of haze and we flew at about 550 feet above the ground. We did not go too fast, and our landing was good…The men were getting out of the planes too slowly and this caused dispersion.” [p. 7.]
Lt. Col. Shanley, 2d Bn, 508th Prcht Inf: “On the flight to drop my Bn. did not experience a great deal of flak. However, we experienced heavier flak that has just been described. A lot of jumpmasters said that the planes took evasive action, and that may be the reason for the dispersion on the jump.” [p. 7.]
[Note: The next four respondents were with glider units. Since this discussion is primarily about paratroopers, it will stay with those units only.]
Brig. Gen. James M. Gavin, (CG task force “A”:
(This statement was dictated on August 16th at Hqs., 82d A/B Division).
[Note: General Gavin did not speak to the subject of the drop. Debriefing, p.10.]
CONCLUSIONS
The Conclusions include; 1. Challenging; 2. Assembly [paratroopers not aircraft]; 3. Equipment; 4. Individual Equipment; 5. Arms; 6. Artillery; 7. Enemy Reaction; 8. Our Own Troops; 9. Pathfinder Aids: 10. Airborne SOP; 11. Weather Conditions; 12. Training.

Under Training, the following was directed at Troop Carrier:
A number of airborne commanders present recommended that it be suggested to Troop Carrier unit commanders that they conduct unit proficiency tests similar to those conducted in this Division. Each unit to be given a mission and be required to execute it under simulated combat conditions. Exact numerical ratings to be given based upon marshaling, briefing, order, flight, timing and accuracy of drop and these ratings then to be made known to the entire command. The troops and unit commanders of this Division are willing and anxious to assist in any way possible in the conduct of this type training. [p.14.]

11. Weather Conditions: [Note: Because of its bearing on the entire mission, the conclusions by the airborne commanders are pertinent.]
It is interesting to note in Operation NEPTUNE that weather conditions were almost ideal until shortly after crossing the West coast of the peninsula. There a dense fog was encountered that lasted almost up to the MERDERET River. This caused considerable dispersion and error in the drop of the 507th and 508th Parachute Infantry Regiments, with the error generally being that of dropping well beyond the DZ where the fog first cleared. Unfortunately, this put most of the equipment in the MERDERET River or the swamps or tributaries of that river. The 505th Parachute Infantry jumping East of the MERDERET River, landed most of its men in the DZ area, and promptly undertook to accomplish its mission. The 507th and 508th Parachute Infantries, with equal promptness, moved to accomplish what was considered the next important mission, and that was the seizure of crossings over the MERDERET River. Due to the wide dispersion of these units, this took a bit more time than was anticipated. [pp.13-14.]

Comments:
1. “They started with the pilots…one suggestion was that every pilot of Troop Carrier Command be made to jump from a plane going 150 miles per hour.
No such statement appears in the copy used for this research!
2. The conclusion concerning weather is interesting in that the attendees state that “this,” the weather, “caused considerable dispersion and error in the drop of the 507th and 508th Parachute Infantry Regiments, with the error generally being that of dropping well beyond the DZ where the fog first cleared.”
This conclusion is quite different from Ambrose’s contention on page 198 that the pilots…”had not been trained for night flying , or flak or bad weather.” [Added].
2. Warren in his study states that “The evidence indicates that except for slight errors in timing, troop carrier performance was almost flawless until the Normandy coast was reached, and that with one exception most subsequent difficulties may be traced to three factors, clouds, enemy action, and limitations of navigational aids.” [Warren, Airborne-Europe, p. 59. His complete discourse on this subject is found in “Evaluation of the Paratroop Operations,” pp.58-61.]
4. Compared to the conclusions reached by the paratroop commanders at Glebe House, the conclusions reached by Troop Carrier were that:

The difficulties encountered in NEPTUNE once again raised the question of whether night paratroop operations were worth while. Given the vulnerability of lighted beacons, the limitations of radar, and the difficulty of keeping formation at night, the advantage of being able to see one’s way might more than balance the daytime hazards of ground fire and air interception incurred in daytime missions—provided the enemy were not too strong. So General Williams decided prior to DRAGOON [Southern France, August 1944], and so General Brereton decided before MARKET GARDEN [Holland, September 1944] and VARSITY [Germany, March 1945]. Never again in World War II did any considerable number of Allied paratroops make a night jump. [Warren, p.61.]

[Note: In actuality, the DRAGOON paradrop was at night. After Normandy, there were no more night glider landings. After DRAGOON , Southern France, there were no more night paradrops.]

5. General Matthew B. Ridgway, commanding officer of the 82nd Airborne Division in a memorandum to General Paul L. Williams, commanding officer of the IX Troop Carrier Command, dated 8 June 1944, entitled “Operations” wrote:

1. I am today dispatching to you under command of Captain Willis T. Evans, all of the Glider Pilots now available within this Division area.

2. Under most difficult conditions, including landing under fire in enemy occupied terrain, these Glider Pilots did a splendid job. On the ground they rendered most willing and effective service, providing protection for the Division Command Post during the most critical period when the Division was under heavy attack from three sides.

3. Please express to all elements within your Command who brought this Division in by Glider or Parachute, or who performed resupply missions for us, our admiration for their coolness under fire, for their determination to overcome all obstacles, and for their magnificent spirit of cooperation.

4. I know it will interest the Troop Carrier Command to learn that within the first few hours the division secured and held its initial objectives, inflicting heavy losses on the enemy ground troops while under heavy attack.

5. I particularly commend Captain Evans.

[Note: Philip C. “Pappy” Rawlins, Col., USAF (ret.), Red Light, Green Light, Geronimo: A History of the 77th Troop Carrier Squadron, 435th Troop Carrier Group in WWII. Pp.74-75. Submitted by Randy Hils.]

6. Letter from Brigadier General James Gavin (ADC, second-in-command to General Ridgway) in France to a friend in England.
Thursday, June 9th [1944]
Dear Hal [General Harold J. Clark, commanding 52nd Troop Carrier Wing],
Through the courtesy of Col. [Bruce D.] Bidwell who is leaving the beachhead today I am able to get this short note to you.
Task force “A” has accomplished most of its objectives—the 505th carrying out its missions exactly as plan1ned. S. Mere Eglise was taken two hours after landing and the 506 and 508 are holding the line of the Merderet. [Lt. Col. Thomas J. B.] Shanley, [commanding 2nd Bn, 508th], [Col. George V. Jr.] Millett [commanding 507th] and [Lt. Charles J.] Timmes [commanding 2nd Bn, 507th] are still cut off but we may be able to pull them out in the next 24 hours.
The accomplishments of the parachute regiments are due to the conscientious and efficient tasks of delivery performed by your pilots and crews. I am aware, as we all are, that your wing suffered losses in carrying out its missions and that a very bad fog condition was encountered inside the west coast of the peninsula Yet despite this every effort was made for an exact and precise delivery as planned. In most cases this was successful.
I want to express to you and all of the officers and enlisted men of your command our appreciation for a job damn well done.
James Gavin
PS. Generally speaking all is going well. The 506th has done remarkedly [sic] well although it has taken heavy casualties in spots.
Would you please call Col. [Joel L.] Crouch [commanding IX Troop Carrier Pathfinder] and express to him our expression for a job well done.

[Note: Facsimile of letter posted in the D-Day exhibit at the Unites States Air Force Museum, Dayton, Ohio.]



6. A Sin of Omission—American Glider Pilots:

Introduction: The American Glider Pilots who flew on the D-Day Missions [NEPTUNE Chicago, Detroit, Keokuk, and Elmira] were assigned to various groups of the IX Troop Carrier Command. They flew the British Horsa and the American built, Waco or CG-4A.
On page 173, para. 4, Ambrose: “Around the airfields, glider troops and paratroopers check their equipment for about the 1,000th time….They were tightly sealed in, ready at a moment’s notice to march out to the airfield and get into the British-built gliders or American-built C-47s to get the invasion under way.” [Note: Since he was writing about glider troops, it may be assumed that he meant, in this context, the “American-built CG-4A” gliders, and not the C-47 aircraft.]
Ambrose devotes little space to the efforts of this group of pilots and their mission. In Chapter 7 on training, just as he ignores the training of the C-47 pilots, so he ignores the training undertaken by the American glider pilots. However, he does include the training of the British glider pilots, and rightfully so “(all sergeants, all members of the Glider Pilot Regiment; there were sixteen of them, two for each of the six gliders scheduled to go in on D-Day plus four reserves.)” [pages 141-142.]
Page 221, para 5: “The glider casualties for the 82nd were heavy. Of the 957 men who went into Normandy that night, twenty five were killed, 118 wounded, fourteen missing (a 16 percent casualty rate.) Nineteen of the 111 jeeps were unserviceable, as were four of the seventeen antitank guns.” [Ambrose does not supply his source for these statistics, nor does he mention the losses of the 101st.]
FACTS: For the four glider missions: Chicago, Detroit, Keokuk, and Elmira:
[Warren, Airborne-Europe, Appendix 1, Table II, “Glider Operations of IX Troop Carrier Command.] The following statistics are for the gliders and troops sent in to support both the 101st and 82nd airborne divisions.
Aircraft dispatched, 313 (including one paratroop plane carrying 16 troops in Elmira): Horsas, 172; Wacos, 141. Glider pilots dispatched, 622; Glider pilots dead or missing (1 Jul 44), 54. [Note: Actually 626 glider pilots were dispatched, but four gliders aborted, 2 Wacos and 2 Horsas. One can assume that each glider (less the 4 aborted) had a pilot and co-pilot. In the MARKET GARDEN (Holland) glider missions, generally, the Waco gliders had one pilot, with a glider infantryman sitting in as co-pilot.]
Troops carried, 1722; landed, 1679 (est.). Landing casualties, Waco Troops, 72; Horsa Troops, 186.
Artillery pieces carried (howitzers and antitank guns), 75.
Vehicles carried, 215.
Cargo tonnage, 174 tons.
Index: “gliders, Allied: Page 639: The indexed items under this heading include assault plan for; deployment; German defenses, against; infantry for; losses of; reinforcements from; and training for. Most of these items are descriptions from “oral histories” or “personal memoirs” of individuals other than glider pilots.
As best that can be determined, only two glider pilots are cited,--Lt. Robert Butler (pages 219 and 220), and Sgt./Lt. Charles Skidmore (pages 159/Sgt., 220/Lt.). Colonel Mike Murphy (page 220) piloted the lead glider in which Brigadier General Don Pratt was killed. But there is no Mike Murphy listed as contributor to the oral histories, etc.
It is possible that more glider pilots contributed to the memoirs, but Appendix A, merely lists the names of the individuals, without any other descriptors.
On the other hand, Cornelius Ryan in his The Longest Day, and in A Bridge Too Far provides name, rank as of D-Day, unit, and post-war occupation, which provides the researcher with tools for digging deeper.



7. Band of Brothers: Ambrose’s Book. The Sins:

Stephen Ambrose, Band of Brothers, E Company, 506th Regiment, 101st Airborne, From Normandy to Hitler’s Eagles Nest. 1992.
Introduction: Ambrose’s book on D-Day used material gathered from members of Company E, 506th Regiment, 101st Airborne Division. Hence, this analysis will first center on pre-invasion and D-Day. An analysis of later periods, where troop carrier and other U.S. Army units are involved, will then follow. In addition, this analysis will also compare some material as it is written in both books.
“Operation Eagle,” 11-12 May 1944: Page 59: Ambrose:

General [Maxwell] Taylor had moved heaven and earth to get enough C-47s for Operation Eagle. The planes were in constant demand for logistical support throughout ETO [European Theater of Operations], and Troop Carrier came last on the list. It was cheated on equipment. The fuel tanks did not have armor protection against flak.

Easy got its briefing for Eagle on May 10-11. The objective was a gun battery covering the beach. The planes made ‘legs’ over England, flying for about two-and-a-half hours. Shortly after midnight, the company jumped. For Easy, the exercise went smoothly; for other companies, there were troubles. Second Battalion headquarters company was with a group that ran into a German air raid over London. Flak was coming up; the formation broke up; the pilots could not locate the DZ. Eight of the nine planes carrying Company H of the 502d dropped their men on the village of Ramsbury, nine miles from the DZ. Twenty-eight planes returned to their airfields with the paratrooper still aboard. Other jumped willy-nilly, leading to many accidents. Nearly 500 men suffered broken bones, sprains, or other injuries.

The only consolation the airborne commanders could find in this mess was that by tradition a bad dress rehearsal leads to a great opening night. [No sources cited.]
Ambrose: “General Taylor had moved heaven and earth to get enough C-47s for Operation Eagle.”
FACT: [Warren, Airborne-Europe, p.25]

The command exercise, EAGLE, deserves attention both as the nearest thing to a true rehearsal for any airborne operation in World War II, and a test to determine whether IX Troop Carrier could carry out its controversial and perilous role in NEPTUNE. EAGLE was originally an exercise for the 50th and 52d Wings with the 101st, the exercise was revised to include the 52d Wing and the 82nd Division. And to correspond as closely as possible to the whole sequence of pre-H-Hour airborne missions as then planned. It was also postponed from the 7th to the 11th and 12th of May so that all units would be ready to participate.

Ambrose: “The planes were in constant demand for logistical support throughout ETO, and Troop Carrier Command came last of the list.”
Comments:
1. “The planes were in constant demand for logistical purposes throughout the ETO.” Discounting the Mediterranean area, the ETO at that period included England, Wales, Scotland and part of Ireland.” What “logistical support purposes” would the Troop Carrier have served? Paratroopers and glider personnel were training during this period. Troop Carrier Command, which dropped troopers and towed gliders, also participated in that training.
2. “…and Troop Carrier Command came last of the list.” What list?

Ambrose: “The planes made ‘legs’ over England flying for about two-and-a-half hours.”
Comment: Ambrose would have the reader believe that the operation was loosely and haphazardly planned with no set destinations. And he gives the impression that the planes meandered loosely for about “two-and-a-half hours.”
As practiced, the Troop Carrier Groups were flying in tight formations on specific courses over predetermined “legs.”
FACT: [Warren continued.]

The main route to be flown ran from March, the 52d Wing assembly point, westward for 159 miles to Cefn Llechid in Wales, then south for 50 miles to a marker boat in the Bristol Channel, and east for 55 miles to Devizes, which was the IP [Initial Point]. Eurekas and beacon lights were spaced at intervals along the way, including assembly points and turns. In addition BUPS beacons were provided on the marker boat at Devizes. Drop zones were to be marked by pathfinder troops essentially as they would be in the invasion. Simulated glider landing zones in the tactical area were to be marked by T’s but after some debate, it had been settled that the gliders would simply be towed over these zones and land in comparable areas marked out on airfields, thus avoiding possible crashes and recovery problems.


Ambrose: “Shortly after midnight, the company jumped. For Easy, the exercise went smoothly, for other companies, there was troubles.”
FACT: [Warren continued, p.26]

After the pathfinders came 19 paratroop serials spaced at 6-minute intervals. The parachute echelon of the 101st was flown by 432 aircraft in 10 serials, half from the 53d Wing and half from the 50th Wing. The first jump was to take place at 0033. The serials of the 53d Wing were uniformly successful. Those of the 50th also did creditably except that one flight from the 440th Group fell out of the formation, missed its drop zone in the haze and returned without making a drop.

The paratroops of the 82d Division were carried in 369 planes of the 52d Wing in nine serials. Unlike the 101st Division which, having prepared the operation long in advance, sent over 6,000 jumpers, the 82d was able to provide only token loads of two jumpers per plane. Only one serial, that of the 442d Group [52d], broke up on the way. Only 16 of its 45 aircraft got to the vicinity of the drop zone and dropped troops. The rest, lost in the haze, returned to base on orders from group headquarters and tried again at dawn. The Eurekas and lights were off at the time and the 442d, baffled, dropped its paratroops 10 miles away. The other serials reached the drop area approximately on course and on schedule, and six did well. However, the aids on the zones of the 314th and 315th [both of 52d] were not on when they arrived. Most of the 314th made a second pass, saw the T, which by then had been lighted, and dropped troops on it. However, nine pilots had given up and gone home, and another nine made drops by guesswork far from the zone. The 315th Group, although it finally received some signals, was too disoriented to make use of them and returned without making any drop.

Ambrose: “Second Battalion headquarters was with a group that ran into a German air raid over London. Flak was coming up; the formation broke up; the pilots could not locate the DZ.”
Personal Recollection: [Joe Flynn, pilot, 77th Troop Carrier Squadron, 435th Troop Carrier Group, 53rd Troop Carrier Wing. “Night Training Missions Flown by Joe Flynn.]
I did not join the 77TCS until early December, 1943, and as a newly assigned pilot, I’m sure that I did not go on all of the night training missions the 435th TCG and the 77th TCS flew.
1944 March 1------2 hrs 30 min
12------3 hrs
15------2 hrs
April 2------2 hrs 40 min
6------3 hrs 15 min
May 12------3 hrs*
15------2 hrs
26------2 hrs 10 min.
TOTAL-Eight night training missions.
My flight time on D-Day, June 6th—3 hours 15 minutes.
[*Note: Operation Eagle.]

One night the flight path of our large formation was just east of London. A German air raid was in progress as we were passing. The searchlights and anti-aircraft guns following the Germans came up to our formation. Colonel McNees radioed to maintain formation, as our flight path was known to the anti-aircraft crews. The lights targeting the enemy above us went through the formation, making things light as day. The flak stopped when it got close to us, then began when the lights reached the other side of the formation. When the lights came close to us, I remember my pilot, George Callicoatte, telling me to cover my eyes, and when it went dark again, ordering me to take over as he was now pretty blind. The practice mission continued as planned.

Ambrose: “Others jumped willy-nilly, leading to many accidents. Nearly 500 men suffered broken bones, sprains or other injuries.”
Comment: The author offers no source for both this statement and the statistic. Yet, this information is generally found in both a unit’s “Sick Report” [ Sick Call], and “Morning Report.”
Page 60, para. 1: “They [Company E] were ready. But, of course, going into combat for the first time is an ultimate experience for which one can never be ready. It is anticipated for years in advance; it is a test that produces anxiety, eagerness, tension, fear of failure, anticipation. There is a mystery about the thing, heightened by the fact that those who have done it cannot put into words what it is like, how it feels, except that getting shot at and shooting to kill produce extraordinary reaction. No matter how hard you train, nor however realistic the training, no one can ever be prepared for the intensity of the real thing.”
Comment: No comment from Troop Carrier!
Ambrose: page 65, para. 2: “At 2200, mount up. The jumpmasters pushed their men up the steps, each of them carrying at least 100 pounds, many of them 150 pounds.”
Comment: This may be partially true. But customarily, since most of the troopers were overloaded, the C-47 crew chief and radio operator helped boost the men up the three steps into the plane.
Ambrose: page 65, para. 4: “On Winter’s plane, Pvt. Joe Hogan tried to get a song going, but it was soon lost in the roar of the motors.”
Comment: “On page 66, para.2, Ambrose writes: “In his plane, the pilot called back to Winters, ‘Twenty minutes out.’”
This statement contradicts the one above about the “roar of the motors.” Moreover, it shows a lack of understanding of what really transpired in a C-47. The noise, generally, was loud enough that crew members had trouble communicating except through its intercommunications system. This was rarely used in combat, except between the pilot and the crew chief who was stationed at the rear of the plane to pass on flight information to the jumpmaster.
In addition, Winters, who was jumpmaster, was located near the rear door. The pilot would truly have had to shout very loudly not only over the roar of the engines but also over the noise of any incoming fire. Too, the door from the cockpit to the fuselage was generally kept closed, making oral exchanges even more difficult.
Pages 66 to 69, and 70 to 72: [These pages describe the jump into Normandy.] They also are repetitious of the language used in the D-Day book. “Fear of midair collisions;” “Lost, bewildered, frightened…” “The pilots were suppose to slow down…‘they never had one minute of combat experience, so they were absolutely terrified.. And rather than throttle down, they were kind of like a fellow thinking with his feet, they thought with that throttle…’” “So they increased their speed, up to 150 miles per hour in many cases…” “They jumped much too low from planes that were flying much too fast.” “Simultaneously, the prop blast tossed them this way and that. With all the extra weight and all the extra speed, when the chutes opened, the shock was more than they had ever experienced.” And so the litany continues.


8. Sins of Inconsistency: B of B versus D-Day:

As noted, Band of Brothers, describes the entire combat experience of Company E in the European Theater. But before the study of B of B continues, it is interesting to note several parallel stories which appear in both books.
B of B, page 61, para. 1: “One member of the 506th recalled that his company was told that the German commandant at its objective St Côme-du-Mont, owned a white horse and was going with a French schoolteacher who lived on a side street just two buildings away from a German gun emplacement that was zeroed in on causeway No. 1. He took his dog for a walk every evening at 2000. [Note 3., Donald R. Burgett, Currahee! (Boston: Hougton Mifflin, 1967), p.67.]
Versus: D-Day, page 102, para. 2: “The 506th Parachute Infantry Regiment [PIR] of the 101st Airborne had as one of its objectives the village of Ste. Marie-du-Mont. Thanks to the Resistance, Lt. Richard Winters of Company E of the 506th knew, among other things, that the local German commander was seeing the local teacher and that he took his dog for a walk every day at precisely 1700 hours.” [Chapter 5, note 24. Richard E. Winters interview, EC.]
B of B, page 63, para.1: “First Lt. Raymond Schmitz decided to ease the tension with some physical activity. He challenged Winters to a boxing match. ‘Come on, Winters, let’s go out there behind the tents and box.’”
“No, go away.”
“Schmitz kept after him. Finally said, ‘O.K. let’s wrestle.’”
“Dammit, enough, you’ve been egging me long enough, let’s go.”
“Winters had been a wrestler in college. He took Schmitz down immediately, but he threw him too hard. Schmitz suffered two cracked vertebrae, went to the hospital, and did not get to go to Normandy.” [No note.]
Versus: D-Day, pages 154-155: “As the days went by, tension mounted, tempers grew shorter. ‘It didn’t take much of a difference of opinion to bring out the sporting instinct,” Private Jeziorski recalled. [Chapter 8, note 10. Edward Jeziorski oral history, EC.] Fistfights were common. Lt. Richard Winters of the 506th got into a scrap with Lt. Raymond Schmitz and cracked two of of Schmitz’s vertebrae, which sent him to the hospital. [Ch. 8, note 11. Richard Winters oral history, EC.] As always in an army camp, especially so in this one, rumors of every imaginable kind raced through the sausages.”



9. Band of Brother: (continued):

Ambrose: page 124, paras. 1 and 2:

It was a beautiful end-of-summer day in northwest Europe , with a bright blue sky and no wind. The Allied airborne attack came as a surprise to the Germans; there were no Luftwaffe planes to contest the air armada. Once over Holland, there was some antiaircraft fire, which intensified five minutes from the DZ, but there was no breaking or evasive action by the pilots as there had been over Normandy.

Easy came down exactly where it was supposed to be. So did virtually all the companies in the division. The landing was soft, on freshly plowed fields, in the memories of the men of Easy the softest they ever experienced…The official history of the 101st declared that this was “the most successful landing that the Division had ever had, in either training or combat.” [Chapter 8, note 1. Rappart and Northwood, Rendezvous with Destiny, 269.]

Comment: There really is no comment at this point, except to note that there is also no mention of Troop Carrier Command’s role in the drop into Holland.


10. We Are Not Alone

During the research, it was learned that Troop Carrier was not the only unit to suffer from Ambrose’s misinformation. The most glaring is his statement on page 272, para. 5 that “Easy Company got there first.” [To Berchtesgaden].
FACT: [U. S. Army in World War II: Special Studies, Chronology, 1941-1945, complied by Mary H. Williams, Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1958), p.531.]

“4 May Western Europe—…
6th Army Group: In the U. S. Seventh Army’s XV Corps area, 7th Inf of 3d Div, crossing into Austria, advances through Salzburg to Berchtesgaden without opposition. 106th Cav Gp, reconnoitering ahead of the 3d Div, accepts surrender of Salzburg. Other elements of corps move forward to Austrian border unopposed. In the XXI Corps area, 12th Armd Div, after continuing toward Innsbruck and Berchtesgaden, is placed in army reserve and releases attached CCV, 2d Fr Armd Div, and 101st Cav Gp (—). CCR reaches Kufstein area (Austria), where it is relieved by 36th Div. Advancing toward Berchtesgaden, CCV, 2d Fr Div, reaches Bad Reichenhall. 4th Div is relieved by 101st A/B Div, which completes movement into corps zone, and is attached to corps, and starts to Neumarkt area for occupation duty within Third Army zone; 8th Inf and 101st Cav Rcn Sq are attached to 101st A/B Div. RCT 506, 101st A/B Div, moves toward Berchtesgaden.”

Comment: It would appear that the 7th Infantry Regiment of the 3rd Infantry reached Berchtesgaden first, followed by the 2nd French Armored Division, and then by the Regimental Combat Team of the 506th Regiment of the 101st Airborne Division.



11. The Mortal Sin:

By his admission that he did not interview any Troop Carrier pilots (or other aircrew men), Ambrose, through the voices of the airborne troopers, presented a picture of these men as an incompetent, untrained, fearful group whose only goal was to save their own skins.
In so doing, he tried to create an atmosphere of distrust and disdain, where, in reality, there existed and still exists a strong relationship—a comradeship that could exist only among men who know what combat means to each soul. In the Civil War it was called, “seeing the elephant.”
“Seeing the elephant” in World War II and in all our wars is the unique experience of every combat soldier, sailor, and marine. That experience has embedded itself in all of them so deeply that the honor of serving one’s country is translated into the honor of respecting, serving, and dying for each other.
No historian or story teller, who has not shared that bond, has the right to miscast their deeds in any medium.



12. The Apologists

In its unsuccessful campaign which began in 1995 to get Ambrose to present the good, moderate and bad truth of its performance on D-Day, 5-6 June 1944, the Troop Carrier community appealed to many people who it thought would understand the need to restore its good name. That effort too failed!
The first inclination is to name names. But that would not be the charitable thing to do. Rather by lumping individuals into their professional groups, each would bear the guilt that each must bear.
Hence, we bombarded these groups with e-mails, letters, phone calls, a general press release, responses to newspaper and magazine articles. Like Pilate, the hands were washed without action in the: political, military, publishing, and media (newspapers, TV, and film) circles.
Like unsuccessful authors, our files are filled with rejection slips. At least in some cases, we were offered the courtesy of a response, sometimes form letters. In others, we heard the chilling silence that comes after the death of one of our comrades who is fortunate enough to no longer have to suffer the hypocrisy of denial.
Following are some of the typical responses from those who gave us the courtesy of an answer:
a. “We certainly appreciate your concerns regarding Dr. Ambrose’s treatment of troop carrier personnel in his historical work. He is, of course, a prolific and well known historian, although we admit that his research seems to be lacking as it pertains to troop carrier units. Unfortunately, we have no control over what has been published in the private sector.” [U.S. Government Historian.]
b. “As a veteran of World War II, the accurate depiction of events which took place on June 6, 1944 is extremely important to me, and I commend you in your efforts on behalf of all veterans. I also urge you to share your views with both the national D-Day Museum as future exhibits are prepared and the publisher of Dr. Ambrose’s books.” [U.S. Senator.] [Note: Letters to the author’s editors were never answered.]
c. “Now I am not here to defend Stephen Ambrose, but in an undertaking the size of his D-Day book there is bound to be a glitch or two, and I don’t know that I’d be willing to string him up by the thumbs on that account alone.” [Book reviewer.]



13. Forgive me for I have sinned. I confess

Some insight into Ambrose’s approach to his art is found in some of his writings, and some of his responses to critics.
1. “When I wrote Pegasus Bridge, I decided not to show the manuscript to Maj. John Howard, the C. O. of D Company, Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire Light Infantry, or any other of the thirty British gliderborne troops I had interviewed. I was working on a deadline that made it impossible to take up the months that would have been involved. The veterans have frequently contradicted each other on small points, and very occasionally on big ones. Not one of them would have accepted what I have written as entirely accurate, and I feared that, if they saw the manuscript, I’d be in for endless bickering over when this or that happened, or what happened, or why it happened.
I felt it was my task to make my best judgment on what was true, what had been misremembered, what had been exaggerated by the old soldiers telling their war stories, what acts of heroism had been played down by a man too modest to brag on himself.
In short, I felt that although it was their story, it was my book. [added.] John Howard was unhappy at being unable to suggest changes and corrections. Since the publication of Pegasus Bridge, he has convinced me that he was right and I was wrong. Had I had time and allowed John and others to make corrections, criticisms, and suggestions, it would have been a more accurate and better book. [added.]
It has been a memorable experience for me. I was ten years old when World war II ended.” [Ambrose, Band of Brothers, pp.319-320.] [Note: A copy of Pegasus Bridge is given to veterans who provide the author and his staff their personal recollections “oral histories.”]
2. “My experiences with the military have been as an observer. The only time I wore a uniform was in naval ROTC as a freshman at the University of Wisconsin, and in army ROTC as a sophomore. I was in second grade when the United States entered World War II, in sixth grade when the war ended. When I graduated from high school in 1953, I expected to go into the army, but within a month the Korean War ended and I went to college instead. Upon graduation in 1957, I went straight to graduate school. By the time America was again at war in 1964, I was twenty-eight years old and the father of five children. So I never served.
…in grade school…I went to the movies three times a week…not to see the films, which were generally real clinkers, but to see the newsreels, which were almost exclusively about the fighting in North Africa, Europe, and the Pacific. We [he and his brothers] played at war constantly: ‘Japs’ vs. marine. GIs vs. ‘Krauts.’ …
So when I put the manuscript of what became Citizen Soldiers in the mail, I promised my wife, Moira, ‘I ain’t going to study war no more.’ I had seen enough destruction, enough blood, enough high explosives.” [added.] [Ambrose, The Victors: Eisenhower and his Boys, The Men of World War II, pp. 11 and 13.]
3. “My interest in D-Day, first inspired by Dr. Pogue’s writing, was strengthened in 1959 when I read Cornelius Ryan’s The Longest Day. I thought then, as I still do, that it was a superb account of the battle. Although I have developed some disagreements with Ryan over what happened on June 6, 1944, and have come to some different conclusions, I would be remiss if I failed to acknowledge my debt to his great work.
This work is based overwhelmingly on oral and written histories collected from the men of D-Day by the Eisenhower Center at the University of New Orleans over the past eleven years. [beginning, circa. 1985].” [Ambrose: D-Day, June 6, 1944: The Climactic Battle of World War II, p.8]
4. To his critics:
a. “Thank you for your letter. I respect your position. Unfortunately, I cannot re-examine the information used to write my book [D-Day], nor compare and contrast it with what you have sent. I have signed several book contracts and must apply myself to researching them. The only thing I can do at this point is to send your letters to me to Eisenhower Center, where some young historian will find them and use them.
I am of course deeply troubled that you, a veteran, have some criticisms of my work. Without the opportunity to delve deeper into the issue you and your friends have raised, I can only say that I have done my best to acknowledge the debt this country and the world owes to you and to all our veterans.” [Ambrose, letter, 14 March 2000.]
b. “And I intend to correct any misapprehensions the troop carrier pilots feel that I’ve perpetuated. And I am on my knees. I really am. I try to do my best.
But I will correct it. I promise. And I am doing the best that I can. It was a big war and there were a lot of people in that war, and mistakes were made.” [Ambrose, transcript of telephone conversation, June 2, 2000. See Section 4 above: “D-Day: Ambrose’s book: The Sins.]
c. “I have no idea why I made this mistake. I am embarrassed to my toes.” [Ambrose, for the full story, see Section 2 above, “The Washington Post Story.”
d. The same mistake, plus many more, were pointed out to Ambrose in a 24-page study done by the Committee for the Protection of “What Is True” in Railroad History relative to his recent book, Nothing Like It in the World: The Men Who Built the Transcontinental Railroad: 1863-1869. [Ambrose, through his son, decided to say, “No comment.” See Section 1 above, “The Sacramento Bee Story.”



14. Go and Sin Some More

In 1998, Simon & Schuster, published Ambrose’s book: The Victors, Eisenhower and His Boys: The Men of World War II.
Ambrose: “As for this book, Alice Mayhew made me do it. Two years ago, I sent in to her the manuscript for a book she eventually titled Citizen Soldiers (she picks all my titles, including the one for this book)…
So when I put the manuscript in the mail of what became Citizen Soldiers, I promised my wife, Moira, ‘I ain’t going to study war no more.’ I had seen enough destruction, enough blood, enough high explosives…
Then Alice called me and said I should do a book on Ike and the GIs, drawing on my previous writings to put together a coherent narrative. She said it would be the easiest book I’d ever write.”
FACTS:
1. Pages 64 through 66 of The Victors are taken almost verbatim from pages 58 to 60 of Band of Brothers.
2. On page 65, with the exception of calling it Exercise Eagle, [as opposed to “Eagle”] Ambrose copies verbatim, the story of Operation Eagle, from Band of Brothers, (page 59).
Comment:
1. The flaws which were found in Ambrose.s depiction of that dress rehearsal for the Normandy drop have been covered in this study under the discussion of Band of Brothers.
2. No other analysis has been made to compare other stories in The Victors with comparable stories in his other WWII books.
Personal Comment:
This compiler has tried to keep the research and the comments strictly within the bounds of objective reporting of history.
In the matter of Operation Eagle, however, I must interject a personal note because Eagle had its emotional impact on the men of the 316th Troop Carrier Group.
Reference: Oprep “B” No. 1 for 24 hours ending Sunset 12 May 1944:

Note 2. Narrative of Operation

Eagle Training Exercise called for seventy two (72) aircraft of the 316th Troop Carrier Group to transport a token paratroop force from Cottesmore via March, DunChurch, Cefn-Liechid, boat #1, boat #2, and on to the DZ near Divzes. Three paratroopers [82 Airborne] were on each plane, two of them jumping over the DZ. The operation went smoothly. The paratroopers being dropped on the DZ at the appointed time with the exception of one man who refused to jump. On the way home after the jump, two of the Group planes collided in mid-air resulting in the loss of all personnel on both planes.

Note 7. Own Personnel Casualties (killed) in aircraft:

Pilots-two engine 3
Group Commander 1
Squadron Commander 1
First Pilot 1
Total 3

Co-pilots-two engine 2
Navigators 2
Crew Chiefs 2
Radio Oper.& Mech. 2
Group Chaplain 1

Note 5. Troop Carried:-
(iv). Two (2) Paratroopers (Jumpmasters) were killed in plane accident referred to
in note 3, section (vi).

The sorrow felt by the airmen who were on that mission still echoes in the words written by Lt. Dwight Maul, 44th Troop Carrier Squadron, 316th TCG: “This date [12 May 1944] is without a doubt, in my mind, the saddest day of my entire career with the 44th TCS, when Col. Fleet’s [Group CO, flying with the 36th TCS]] and Joe Sharber’s [first pilot of 44th TCS] airplanes collided in mid-air. Many of our good friends and buddies paid the supreme sacrifice.” [Letter, Maul to Ben Kendig, CO of 44th, no date, 1997.]
Our sorrow is shared with our comrades of the 82nd Airborne. Both jumpmaster observers, Captain John D. Rice, and 2nd Lt. William A. Gullick, were with the 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment.



go back to Manuscript menu